THE NEW REPUBLIC

MAR

Is War Obsolete?

Louis J. Halle

The Censorship Bugaboo

Michael A. Taylor

Katherine Anne Porter

Stanley Kauffmann

PR for Portugal

Daniel M. Friedenberg

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Cozy Hideaway

★ About the time you read this the House should be passing the Kennedy tax bill, first of the Administration's big three. We dropped in at the Rules Committee last week to watch the final stage of preparation.

Long ago Kennedy proposed the measure – but what is time to Congress? Congress is the vat where urgency evaporates. Worried by slow economic growth Kennedy in 1961 noted that America's plant and machinery are disgracefully outdated in competition with other countries. Most of these give tax concessions for modernization and the Administration thinks we should do the same. The idea isn't new, a good many economists back it though some aren't sure.

As concocted by Secretary Dillon and the House Ways and Means Committee the bill carried a $1.75 billion corporate relief package; this Treasury loss of revenue to be made up by closing loopholes elsewhere (including extension of the withholding tax to stock dividends and interest payments).

So now here we are in the cozy Rules Committee hideaway to which perhaps 100 of the million sightseers who come annually to Washington will ever penetrate. The room is small but opulent, it is about the size of the board room of a third rate city. Seven blue leather chairs face seven others down the center table; a chandelier with ropes of prisms glitters above, and three small windows let in light through four feet of Capitol masonry. By actual count there are 32 seats for press and public, yet here is a seat of naked power in Congress, the bottleneck of progress – where haughty chairmen of other House committees quail and grow obsequious.

Stocky, red-faced Wilbur Mills (D, Ark.), chairman of the Ways & Means Committee, considered by many to have the best technical brain in Congress, is explaining his committee's bill. He is a doodler with a difference, he first draws a picture, then erases it, talking all the time. Mills is cautious, timid and conservative so, by the mad incongruity of American government, he becomes spokesman for all the urgent, quivering Kennedy "must" bills – tax, trade, and medical aid. He is chairman, of course, not because he has brains but because he has seniority; seniority is the medium of exchange in Congress.

Mills explains the huge bill without notes for an hour. And he makes plain that his committee has granted the fat cats the concessions Kennedy recommended but has only partly met the cost with new revenue-producing measures. There is a big deficit.

The Pope

★ Mills is a big shot in Congress. As a token of this, the committee room where he presides is so huge you could hold a basketball game in it. But here Mills is only an archbishop in a consistory of cardinals, with the Pope at the far end. The "Pope"? – Rep. Howard W. Smith, 79, of Virginia – House Rules Committee Chairman.

"Judge" Smith is tall and stooped with shaggy hair and an ancient codfish face. His tufted eyebrows, if waxed, would be as long as Salvador Dali's mustache. A sad, Grant Wood-American Gothic type, he looks like a judge of a municipal court which, in fact, he was.

With Smith's secretary leaning over his shoulder to find the place for him, and the glass of turbid water in front (which seems to have been left over from last week) you might think the Judge an extinguished ember. But a coal burns inside him, a dedication – a Hooverian passion – for a balanced budget, come war, come pestilence. He fondles his long cigar with delicate relish. "We'll curry that horse later," he observes ominously at one point.

Mills draws his final doodle, tidily erases it, and stops. Then comes a memorable moment. In a grating voice Smith throws 10 months' hearings out of the window. The bill doesn't balance, he says in effect, and so to hell with it.

Arbitrary? Maybe. But he speaks for the conservative coalition in Congress, the power that controls. And Mills doesn't seem too downcast. One imagines he anticipated this. It is up to him to go back and tell his committee now that they must meet Smith's wishes. Unless they do the bill won't get an exit visa from Rules and can't reach the House floor. (You are probably going to see the same process repeated on the trade bill, and particularly on the health bill.)

And so, 48 hours later, here we are again! Same place, same people but changed bill. Mills succinctly tells what has been done that morning in the Ways and Means Committee to meet the Smith ultimatum.

Reporters' jaws gape as he briskly drops tens of millions here, hundreds of millions there. Instead of adding new revenue to balance the bill, the Kennedy program has been lopped back all along the line. In other words, it has been balanced down, not up.

How It's Done

★ Smith was right, it was a bad bill. In some ways it still is. Against Kennedy's wishes the utility boys have jumped aboard to get a free ride with their own three percent tax subsidy. (This is outrageous because utility rates are already adjusted to pay for plant modernization.) Yet this was not the reason Smith vetoed it. He applied his simple rule of a balance and when he got that let the watered-down measure through regardless of any other defects.

So now with the Rules Committee's nod the tax bill comes to the House floor. It has a "closed rule," *i.e.*, the House must take it or leave it without change and with limited debate. Very little of this procedure gets into the papers. Few people understand it. Yet in one way or another it affects everything, sometimes merely exacting conservative tribute, sometimes killing a bill dead, like school aid. That's how it's done in Washington. We thought you'd like to know.

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Why Not Say Yes?

THE WEEK

3. Why Not Say Yes?; Back to Berlin; Argentina and the Alianza; *Save Us From Our Friends; Tax Havens; Jackson on the UN; Footnotes to the Week; Rich and Poor Railroads; Pipe Dreams*

ARTICLES

9. Public Relations for Portugal
by Daniel M. Friedenberg

13. Is War Obsolete?
by Louis J. Halle

17. The Censorship Bugaboo
by Michael A. Taylor

22. The Superficial Aspect
by Gerald W. Johnson

DEPARTMENTS

23. Books *27. Feiffer*
28. Architecture *30. Correspondence*

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First by demanding tripartite control over inspection machinery, then by preparing secretly for nuclear tests, then by refusing to admit either inspectors or detection equipment to Russian soil, then by informally rejecting an Indian proposal for an international inspection system located outside the Soviet Union and the United States, and most recently by telling neutral delegates to the Geneva Conference that unless the Americans can stop French testing the Russians will not even accept their own scheme for a formal treaty monitored by existing national seismographic systems, the Soviet Union has gradually convinced even the most optimistic Western diplomats it does not want a test ban at all.

If the Russians do not want a test ban, the United States is missing a great opportunity by continuing to insist that a treaty provide elaborate inspection mechanisms to detect small underground explosions. The plain fact is that any significant test can be detected and verified by existing means. This is not because it is easier than US spokesmen claim to pinpoint underground tests; if anything, it is harder, for there is serious doubt whether even on-site inspection could locate a well disguised hole in the ground. But such underground tests, even if some went undetected, would not threaten America's nuclear superiority. And as we discovered last fall, if the Soviets do test again, they will probably test in the atmosphere, and the results will be known to everyone.

The only inspection of significant military value to the US would be extensive, on-site searches for evidence of secret test preparations. Then, were a suspected violation discovered, the US could begin its own preparations, and would thus reduce the risk of our falling even a few months behind in the technological race. Yet this kind of inspection is so infeasible even the Pentagon brushes it aside. It would require our living with every scientist in the Soviet Union. Dean Rusk has merely suggested that heads of state should make regular declarations of good faith, and that inspectors should occasionally visit the known sites of earlier Soviet and American tests.

The reasons for the US insistence on international inspection are four. First, many officials are still thinking in terms conceived four years ago, when the potential military value of underground tests in developing tactical nuclear weapons – and indeed the potential military significance of tactical nuclear weapons themselves – were highly rated. More recently, the scientists have de-emphasized the military

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potential of underground blasts, and the military has downgraded the utility of tactical nuclear war, but policy has not caught up with facts. Second, many feel that the US cannot let the Russians have the last word, and they tested last. Either we must test ourselves or else we must make the Soviets pay some other penalty – such as accepting an inspection scheme they don't want. To have the Soviets test, and then to reward them by accepting their uninspected test ban treaty, would be humiliating – and would encourage them to think that if they tested again, we might offer other concessions. We must, in short, be "tough."

Yet the most effective "punishment" would be to force on the Soviets a treaty they don't want, or at least make it plainer to the world that they are responsible for the lack of agreement.

A third reason for insisting on elaborate inspection is that while officials may admit privately that international inspection has become relatively unimportant, they say it would be politically disastrous to sign an "uninspected" treaty: the Senate would never ratify it. This may be true. But if the Administration made a serious effort to explain not merely that "some risks are inevitable," but that the risks in a nationally-monitored test ban are no greater than the risks in an internationally-monitored one, the Senate might re-examine earlier assumptions.

The fourth argument for international inspection is the most sophisticated. It is that if the Russians are now more interested in testing their own weapons than in preventing the US from testing, no treaty will change this. By accepting Soviet proposals which may have been offered solely for propaganda purposes, we may "trick" the Russians into signing a treaty. But even if we do, the Russian military will probably still be allowed to go ahead with preparations for more tests. If the Soviets then decide, in some future "Berlin" situation, to resume tests despite the treaty they had reluctantly signed, the international atmosphere would be gloomier than it is now. It can be argued, in short, that treaties which are signed primarily for propaganda purposes, and do not reflect the felt interests of the great powers, are worse than no treaty at all, since they discredit all East-West diplomacy. And yet, the potential gain from such a treaty, in inhibiting both the spread of nuclear weapons and the likelihood of their future use; in stopping, however temporarily, the poisoning of the atmosphere, and in opening new possibilities for negotiations on more serious problems, seems to us to offset the danger which might arise if the treaty were broken.

If this is so, the US should without further ado accept the Soviet proposals for a treaty policed by each nation on its own. The worst that can happen will be that the Soviets will sign and cheat, which they could as easily do if the US plan for international inspection had been adopted. More likely, the Soviets will refuse the offer on the pretext that the French won't sign, and the Administration will thus shift much of the responsibility for the continuation of testing to Moscow. Conceivably the Soviets will sign and will abide by the treaty, which would be the first major diplomatic breakthrough since Mr. Kennedy became President.

Back to Berlin

Although the 17-nation meeting in Geneva is billed as a disarmament conference, the subject on which Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko spent much of their time together was Berlin. There appears to have been some progress beyond the five Moscow talks between Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson, which were handicapped by the narrow limits Adenauer had forced his allies to accept when he was in Washington last November. Adenauer's condition was that bargaining be confined to Berlin, which meant no bargaining, for the West could not compromise the safety and freedom of the Berliners, and the Russians on their part would not guarantee free access without concessions in return.

"Is that you again?"

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To broaden the scope of the discussion, Secretary Rusk had to get the consent of the German Foreign Minister, Gerhart Schroeder, which he did at their meeting at Lausanne before the Geneva conference opened. Varying approaches to questions of European security have since been canvassed by the US and the Soviet foreign ministers, and this seems to have induced Mr. Gromyko to take a short step in the West's direction by picking up the idea of an international authority to supervise access to West Berlin, the idea President Kennedy first put forward last summer to Khrushchev's son-in-law.

All that has been officially reported about the Rusk-Gromyko talks is that they included "some elements" of the peace plan laid before the Foreign Ministers' meeting by Christian Herter in May, 1959. The main elements in that plan were an inspection zone in Central Europe (to guard against surprise attacks), and creation of a mixed committee representing both East and West Germans. Both proposals were tied to a longer range scheme for German reunification. This 1959 plan was rejected by the Soviets.

Shortly before the current Geneva conference, the Russians initiated new harassments in the air corridors. First they dropped "chaff" to disrupt radar communications; then they sent military transport planes into the corridor to coincide with Western flights. The harassments reflect the same political purpose the Russians have had since 1948: stabilization of East Germany and perpetuation of the division of Germany. Again and again Gromyko has come back to the theme that there must be, if not formal recognition, at least "respect" for the GDR. His version of an international authority to supervise access to and from Berlin is the clearest proof of this. He asks the West to recognize Communist Germany's right to control access; the international authority would do no more than adjudicate disputes. The US, on the other hand, would place full authority in an international commission.

The differences between these views are tremendous but perhaps not irreconcilable. The West will not surrender physical control over access routes to the East Germans, because that would mean the end of the freedom of West Berlin, which for the individual means the freedom to come and go by air. At the same time, some form of acknowledgment of the East German state's existence by the Western powers might be a price which would be worth paying and which the Soviets would accept for a *modus vivendi* on Berlin. If a mixed committee of East and West Germans could be set up (independently or in conjunction with the UN) and given some tasks in Berlin – for example, surveillance of propaganda and espionage "irritants" – this would imply a measure of "respect" for the Ulbricht regime, perhaps enough to persuade the Russians to drop their insistence on a "free city" status.

The question unanswered is: how serious are the Soviets about wanting to give real authority to the East Germans over access routes? They may not be serious at all, for that would give Germans a decision over war and peace in Central Europe. In any case, without some *de facto* recognition of the East German state, no Berlin settlement is in sight.

Argentina and the *Alianza*

The victory of the *Justicialist* party in the Argentine elections was unexpected and sweeping. In a notably free and honest contest the newly-legalized followers of Juan Peron won 10 of the 19 governorships and 44 of 86 seats at stake in the lower house. This political revolution was more than a personal tribute to the aging ex-dictator, who has been living quietly in exile in Madrid and seems to have little inclination to return to power. The voting indicates widespread discontent with the Frondizi regime, and a pervasive mood of resentment, pro-Castroism, and anti-Americanism which bodes ill for the Alliance for Progress.

In legalizing Peronism, the government promised that any *Justicialist* candidates who were elected would be permitted to take office; yet President Frondizi, under Army pressure, has installed military rule in five of the affected provinces, among them Buenos Aires, where one of every three Argentines lives. Frondizi himself may or may not survive to the end of his term in 1964; regardless, he is now completely subordinate to the ruling clique of generals. He has called for help on ex-President General Aramburu, who many months ago said: "We are going to let him [Frondizi] reach the end of the line . . . but with his tongue hanging out."

Conservative officials have been in the habit of blaming the Peron regime for all of Argentina's troubles. It is true that a painful period of retrenchment after the 10-year-long Peronist joyride was inevitable. But Argentina has great natural resources, a population that is 90 percent literate and 98 percent European in origin. It is six and a half years since Peron's downfall – surely time enough for positive economic progress to have been made. There are surface signs of prosperity: oil production has more than doubled in the past three years (partly because Frondizi invited foreign exploitation of the oil fields – an unpopular act), the *peso* is stable and convertible, and new foreign investment has risen to more than $100 million a year. All of this, however, has not meant much to white collar workers, salaried employees and the *descamisados* (shirtless ones), who have had to bear the brunt of the government's austerity program and a ruinous inflation that at times has been as high as five percent a month.

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Secretary Rusk, by insisting on a hard line against Castro at Punta del Este this February, can take some of the credit for what is happening in Argentina. The US forced Frondizi into open, and damaging opposition; Argentina, along with the other major nations, abstained on the final vote to expel Cuba from the OAS. The reaction of the Argentine military was swift. Immediately after the conference it forced the most pro-American Argentine politician of this century, against his shrewder judgment, to break relations with Cuba – a politically disastrous example of truckling to the unpopular Generals and the *Yanqui* State Department. An *Alianza* loan of $150 million shortly before the elections was also interpreted as evidence of US meddling in Argentine politics, comparable to Spruille Braden's blundering campaign against Peron in 1946.

Save Us from Our Friends

Anti-government demonstrations, strikes and street-fighting marked the most serious of the many crises that have plagued the four-year-old, US-sponsored regime of Guatemala's Manuel Ydigoras Fuentes. A student-led protest against last December's fraudulent elections (in which the official party "won" 25 of 33 Congressional seats) was broken up by the Army and secret police. For the first time, troops were ordered to fire into crowds and to shoot to kill; 50 demonstrators died, hundreds more were wounded. Ydigoras has charged that his enemies are "Castro Communists," yet even businessmen and conservatives are disgusted with the inefficiency and corruption of his regime. Martial law continues, the Army is still loyal, but the 67-year-old leader's grip is weakening.

US aid, larger on a per-capita basis than to any other Latin country except Bolivia, has not been accompanied by economic and social reforms. Even the few hundred plantation owners who hold more than half the land in Guatemala are being hurt by the continued slump in bansas and coffee. Wages are mean: the US manager of the Firestone Rubber plantation outside Retalhuleu, for example, prides himself on paying his workers 80 cents a day; the going rate is 60 cents.

Guatemala has neither an income tax nor an adequate agrarian reform program, and little prospect of getting either; the regime's only "reform" bill has been a law guaranteeing compensation in dollars to US firms affected by expropriation or currency devaluation. But this has not halted the flight of native and foreign capital, frightened by *fidelismo* and discouraged by Ydigoras' appetite for graft. The wily old *caudillo* has remained in Washington's good graces by cooperating in diplomatic and military maneuvers against Castro – last year's invasion of Cuba was based in Gautemala.

Tax Havens

The tax revision bill now before the House raises a question about the Administration's attitude toward foreign investment. Why is it proposed to reduce tax incentives which encouraged the tremendous post-World War II outflow of private capital into foreign investment, and this at a time when the Administration is beating the drums for freer trade and closer economic ties with Western Europe?

True, the tax bill sets up a liberalized system for figuring depreciation on industrial plant and equipment, so as to enlarge corporate "cash flow" rather substantially and thereby free more capital for investment at home and abroad, which the Administration counts on to spur economic growth.

Yet the bill also forbids "unreasonable accumulation" of funds abroad, sets up penalties and inducements intended to channel them into underdeveloped countries, and reduces the credit which a corporation gets against US taxes for those it pays abroad.

After World War II, the outrush, especially to Europe, of private investment capital was welcomed, for the national aim was to speed recovery abroad. But the emergence of West Europe and Japan as hearty competitors has signalled the end of that era. Now, the Administration says, the problem is how to keep the annual US deficit in international payments (currently running about $2 billion) from getting out of hand.

Though there is room for honest difference over whether the President is letting this worry bulk too large in domestic as well as international policy, there is much less room for doubt where tax havens are concerned. And here the new tax bill is quite specific.

At present, an American individual or corporation need pay no US tax on his foreign profits until they are "repatriated." While abroad, there's no US tax and no time limit on this deferral. If he plays his cards right, the investor can turn deferral into forgiveness. He can, for example, reinvest in high-interest-bearing foreign securities. Then any repatriated profits are taxable as "capital gains"– at a much more favorable rate. Since any foreign taxes are credited against US taxes, the benefit can be multiplied.

Another way to cash in on tax havens – in the Bahamas, Venezuela, Liechtenstein or certain Swiss cantons is to establish a subsidiary to buy and sell for you or to exercise patent and licensing rights. Typically, one American company set up a subsidiary in Caracas to market its electrical controls throughout the world. The company "sold" them at cost to the "dummy" (which had only one employee); it then resold them at a normal markup. Within the three years ending with 1960, roughly a million dollars in profits were thereby accumulated in Caracas, free of US taxation.

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The proposed tax reforms would not stop the worst abuses entirely, but would lessen the positive incentive that now exists for tax avoidance. The result should be more investment capital channeled into productive use. There is relatively little objection to reinvestment in branch factories abroad, especially in underdeveloped countries. The government already offers insurance against expropriation and other unusual hazards which investment capital faces in such higher-risk areas. But there needs to be a proportionate reduction in the kind of fast-buck speculative reinvestment which the present tax-haven policy stimulated. Capital lured abroad by the prospect of lush boodle available through artful use of tax havens is a drain. It reaps but does not sow; it creates no jobs for Americans at home or abroad.

Jackson on the UN

Senator Jackson, in an address at the National Press Club March 20, made two incontestable points: the United Nations is not a substitute for US foreign policy, and, the United Nations cannot end the Cold War. Having stated the commonplace, the Senator moved on to the ambiguous and the contradictory.

He said that the UN "should continue to be an important avenue of American foreign policy," yet wondered whether "the involvement of the UN in our policy-making has not at times hampered the wise definition of our national interest. . . ." He stated that "the maintenance of peace depends . . . on the strength and will of its [UN's] members to uphold the charter," but later amended this by insisting that "peace depends on the power and unity of the Atlantic Community and on the skill of our direct diplomacy." He warned that the UN "absorbs a disproportionate amount of the energy of our highest officials," yet he had not discussed his speech in advance with either the President or the Secretary of State so as to learn whether these "highest officials" themselves feel the UN is taking up too much of their "worry time."

He noted "with some concern proposals to increase the Executive responsibilities of the organization," but did not say what proposals, if any, he had in mind. He questioned the value of "UN presences to halt infiltration of guerrillas across frontiers," leaving his audience to wonder whether he thought US military forces might more efficiently police the peace in the Congo or the Sinai peninsula.

He favored the UN's becoming more of a forum, "more often a place where diplomatic representatives quietly search for acceptable settlements of issues between their countries." Then, having advocated that the UN make fewer decisions and talk more, he said that "Everyone talks too much. . . . Sometimes it seems

Footnotes *to the* Week

THE SUPREME COURT'S 6-2 decision in favor of 11 Tennessee residents who challenged the districting in their state legislatures (the state has not reapportioned since 1901) opens the way for suits by citizens from other underrepresented urban areas. The majority (Justices Frankfurter and Harlan entered heated dissents) avoided the issue of constitutionality in granting federal court jurisdiction in reapportionment cases. — GOLDWATER'S *Park Central store in Phoenix was host to a meeting of the Anti-Communist Movement of Arizona. Featured speaker: R. Carter Pittman of Georgia. His subject: the Negro. His point: "Negroes can never be the equal of whites. . . . The only difference between the Congolese and American Negro is that the Congolese eat more white people than those in America."* — SEN. AIKEN (R, Vt.) believes delinquent states would pay their UN bills more readily if they had to repay in three years a $100 million US loan (which the UN doubts could be done, doesn't want, hasn't asked for and probably wouldn't take) than if the US buys $100 million of UN bonds repayable in 25 years. Aiken's dislike of bonds stems less from reasons he alleges (misleading State Department sales presentation, insufficient consultation with Senators or advance notice of the proposal) than from misgivings about UN Peace Operations themselves: a UN military presence, he fears, might someday be used against US interests, say in Cuba. — MADAME NGO DINH NHU, *the controversial, powerful sister-in-law of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, is flying to Mexico City on April 3 with a parliamentary delegation from South Vietnam. Lest it be imagined that she is being eased out of the country under US pressure, Vietnamese stress that the trip was her own idea (returning an earlier visit to Saigon by a Mexican group) and that she will go directly back after a few days in London.* — A STATUE of Harry Truman is being placed in an Athens park to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, proclaimed when one-third of the country was controlled by Communist guerrillas. Today, saved from Communism, Greece has 700,000 un- or under-employed out of eight million people; more than two million are destitute; 9 percent of the budget is spent for domestic security. Greece also spends 6.1 percent of her national income on the Army, the highest percentage of any non-atomic power. — DEMOCRATS *are interested in an analysis based on latest Gallup Poll findings sent to the White House by Census Director Richard Scammon. If party preferences continue unchanged, Democrats could win more seats this fall than in 1958, when they gained 21 more than in '60. Sixty-one percent of voters last week said they preferred the Democrats.*

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that the appropriate legend to place above the portals of the UN might be: 'Through these doors pass the most articulate men and women in the world'." Should Ambassador Stevenson be replaced by some stuttering civil servant?

Finally, the Senator found it unfortunate that our Ambassador to the UN should sit in on Cabinet meetings and implied that this means the President thinks "the requirements of sound national policy can be more clearly seen in New York than elsewhere." But New York is not the UN, nor can the US delegation to the UN be simply another "embassy." It cannot be only that, for the UN *is* the world forum, as Senator Jackson says it should be.

Rich and Poor Railroads

The railroad situation grows stranger by the hour. In the New York-New England area the directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford announce that they have barely enough cash to continue operations through the rest of the year; if they are to run after that deadline they will need more relief. The point has been underscored by the federal government, whose observers on the scene have released the information that Washington's stake in the system is now almost $50 million; that no more federal assistance is to be expected, in the form of loans anyway; and that the government would like to get some of that money back. There is an outside possibility of some federal tax relief on fares in this session of Congress. There is a slender possibility of further state tax relief – though at the moment, since all four states through which this ailing road passes have suspended the usual real estate taxes, it is difficult to see how further aid of that sort can be extended. Meanwhile, the New York, New Haven and Hartford keeps running at a loss.

At the same time another railroad, the Kansas City Southern has a sizable surplus and announces that it intends to invest its extra money in other businesses. "The management (of the Kansas City Southern)," says its official notification to the Interstate Commerce Commission, "has determined that prospects for significant growth in the railroad industry are lacking and that the interest of its shareholders can best be served by diversification into non-carrier business or businesses." So the KCS is planning to organize a satellite company to be called Kansas City Industries, Inc. Common and preferred stockholders of the KCS will be given two shares of common or preferred, respectively, for each unit of their holdings of either kind; and the plan will be considered to have been approved by them if 80 percent of the original shares have been exchanged. Since the railroad will continue to operate as usual under this scheme, what will ensue is a mixture of regulated and unregulated business. The KCS may, for instance, go into the spaghetti business, where the law of the market prevails, while it continues to function as a *regulated* business on the side.

This raises a question of public policy. Should a group franchised to operate what amounts to a monopoly – a railroad – be allowed to invest its surplus in other kinds of business activity? The question would not arise if the KCS used the additional earnings to extend its services, or if the railroad distributed the money in the form of extra dividends to its stockholders. But the latter action might attract the notice of state and federal regulatory agencies. Questions might be raised about the feasibility of lowering the fares as a method of permitting the public – the ultimate grantors of the franchise – to share in the earnings.

Further questions should be raised when the KCS notification is examined at the ICC, particularly in view of a recent study of railroad merger policy by two staff officials of the agency. They recommended that the pending mergers of the three big eastern systems be disapproved unless these groups of roads consent to include in their mergers certain feebler railroads which the ICC will assign to them.

The same requirement should be applied, in all consistency, to the Kansas City Southern. Surely there is an ailing railroad, or one that is merely breaking even on poor service in the vicinity of Kansas City Southern. As long as there are weak railroads in this country, the strong should not be allowed to transfer their resources out of the industry.

Pipe Dreams

In *The New Republic* for January 15 the available evidence for the existence of a Soviet fallout shelter program was sifted carefully. The Soviet Union, it was pointed out, had continued to maintain a huge home defense organization largely composed of volunteers, and while the literature distributed to these volunteers contained many references to various types of shelters, practically none had been seen or otherwise identified by outside observers. Since shelters must be marked in order to be useful to a large population, it seemed reasonably clear the Soviet Union had no shelter program other than what it had in World War II.

On March 23, *The New York Times* ran a surprisingly-captioned front-page story: A Shelter System in Soviet Hinted / Westerners Detect Signs of Big Protection Network." A first reading of the dispatch from Moscow left a schizoid sensation – its headline kept floating away from its body. For what the story said was that the Soviets are showing civil defense movies

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at a public exhibition that has now been going on in Moscow for several years. These movies identify certain kinds of pipes that stick out of the ground in Soviet cities as air vents for public shelters. Certain concrete installations "the height of a man and about four feet square [which] usually have wooden latticed windows," (protection from fallout?) are escape hatches designed to allow persons to escape from shelters upon which a building has collapsed.

But on the other hand, the story continued, no new shelter construction has been observed anywhere – and "this may indicate that the shelter program has been discontinued." In support of this inference, other Soviet films shown at the same civil defense exhibit were cited, in which the simulated enemy bomber shown dropping explosives was recognizably a B-29, an obsolete aircraft used in World War II. Furthermore, "there is no apparent discussion of or interest in shelter construction" among Muscovites today; and their demeanor at the exhibit "did not indicate that they were being given any intensive course in civil defense." The right hand giveth and the left taketh away.

Public Relations for Portugal

The Angola Story, as Told by Selvage and Lee

by Daniel M. Friedenberg

The American public was mildly interested at the end of 1961 to learn from the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Carl T. Rowan, that "there has been a clever big-money campaign to convince Americans that they ought to support Katanga's secession." Rowan specifically named Michel Struelens, a Belgian, as the Belgian-paid lobbyist directing the campaign in the US.

Another public relations operation, under way for a year with even greater resources than were available to Struelens, has been attempting to sway American opinion about Angola. It is an operation run by Selvage and Lee, Inc., which is being paid to discredit the attempt of the Angolan people to free themselves from Portugal.

A May 17, 1961, *New York Times* dispatch dated Lisbon, Portugal, informed its readers that Selvage and Lee, Inc., an American firm engaged in the business of public relations, had been given a one-year contract by "a private Portuguese banking and business syndicate" which has raised "more than $1 million . . . to publicize Portugal's policies and achievements in Angola and other overseas territories." The name of this "private Portuguese syndicate" was the Overseas Companies of Portugal. That it was merely an intermediary through which the Salazar government could operate with anonymity could be inferred from a statement later filed with the Department of Justice by Selvage and Lee, as required by the Foreign Agents' Registration Act, which revealed that the Overseas Companies of Portugal was organized in Lisbon in April – one month before the contract with Selvage and Lee was let. And it was perhaps not coincidence that this contract came shortly after a speech by Adlai Stevenson at the UN Security Council in which he, alone among the Western leaders, endorsed a resolution calling on Portugal "to desist forthwith from repressive measures . . . in Angola."

What and who are Selvage and Lee?

James P. Selvage was Assistant Executive Vice President of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) from 1933 to 1938 and became president of what is now Selvage and Lee, Inc. in 1938. He was a delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1940 and Assistant to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1943-44.

Morris Lee, Jr. worked in public relations for the NAM before becoming Selvage's partner in 1939.

Among the firm's clients as of June 15, 1961, were the American Committee for Flags of Necessity (representing owners of ships operating under Panamanian, Liberian and Honduran flags), The American Economic Foundation, American Railway Car Institute, Pan American World Airways System, Pullman Incorporated, Spanish Olive Oil Institute and Republic Steel.

With an initial grant of $150,000 from the "Portu-

Daniel M. Friedenberg *is a New York businessman who writes extensively on international affairs.*

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guese banking and business syndicate," S & L set out last year to "combat false or misleading information relating to current strife in Angola" – that is, to convince Americans that the revolt in Angola was Communist-instigated, that the anti-colonial party, the Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA) was Communist-leaning, and that its head, Holden Roberto, was "under Moscow tutelage."

Selvage and Lee faced one difficulty: Protestant ministers, especially those of the Methodist church, working in Angola, knew that the revolt was caused by unbearable conditions rather than Communist infiltration. They not only knew but they had the audacity to say what they knew in magazines such as *Look*, *Harper's* and *Newsweek*, as well in *The New York Times* and *The Christian Science Monitor*.

Within a week of the signing of the contract, the methods to be employed by Selvage and Lee were signaled. In answer to a letter from Leonard M. Perryman, Director of the Department of News Service of the Methodist Church Board of Missions, James P. Selvage expressed "some doubt whether you, as 'an employee' of a church organization are qualified to enter into matters of such delicate foreign affairs," suggested that "it is the Communists who are pushing for action in the United Nations at this time," and referred to Portugal as "a great ally during the war" – which is factually incorrect, since Portugal refused to fight its fascist brothers, and indeed sympathized with them until it became apparent they would lose.

Tight Rein

The Methodists and other Christian denominations refused to knuckle down. When the Portuguese authorities began to arrest clergymen in Angola, a group of 80 churchmen and laymen in the United States and Canada, including prominent Protestants and Catholics, protested to President Americo Tomas of Portugal.

A Pianist Named Philippa Schuyler

Now a curious thing occurred. On July 1, 1961, *The Pittsburgh Courier*, "Largest Negro weekly newspaper chain in the world . . . avidly read every week by more than 700,000 Negroes from Coast to Coast," as the *Courier* states proudly on its masthead, published a special 16-page Supplement eulogizing the Portuguese Government for its policy in Angola. The Supplement, filled with pictures of mixed white and black couples, was a defense of Portugal and Portuguese Africa, which "have been the targets of so much . . . misrepresentation and downright falsehood" according to George S. Schuyler, Associate Editor of the *Courier*. Mr. Schuyler, "a Negro with many years experience of world travel," as he put it, had just returned from a trip to the African colony on invitation of the Portuguese Government.

In order for this extraordinary Supplement to receive the widest attention, Mr. Schuyler sent a special letter to a variety of publicity and political organs, concentrating on those which would normally not receive standard publications of the American Negro press.

At about the same time Mr. Schuyler was circulating his "factual and unbiased [though pro-Portugal] picture," prominent white religious leaders, both Protestant and Catholic, were protesting, in their own words, "indiscriminate killings" in Angola that "threaten to explode into a war of extermination between Portuguese and Africans"; Adlai Stevenson as US Ambassador to the UN was voting against Portuguese repression in Africa; and Lisbon was announcing that reforms were to be introduced in Angola giving more self-determination than the colony had ever known in 450 years of colonial rule. But Mr. Schuyler in the *Courier* started off his Supplement by stating unequivocally: "The central fact about Portuguese Africa . . . is that within its vast area of 794,959 square miles there is no racial or color discrimination."

Every man has a right to his own opinion, George S. Schuyler included. It is worthwhile to note, however, that the six-month statement filed by Selvage and Lee with the Department of Justice on December 29, 1961, included three interesting items. The first was that

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from May 12 to October 25, 1961, it has spent on behalf of Overseas Companies of Portugal $207,200.16. The second indicated that of monies disbursed for the distribution of selected material, *The Pittsburgh Courier* was a beneficiary. The third was that a pianist by the name of Philippa Schuyler was employed by Selvage and Lee. Miss Schuyler is the daughter of George S. Schuyler.

At this point it may have seemed to Selvage and Lee that the firm might be criticized for its more overt activities as a foreign agent. For a new organization was heard from: the name – Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs – evoked the image of Americans of Portuguese descent rushing to aid their beleaguered homeland.

The first act of the Portuguese-American Committee, whose expenses are paid by the Overseas Companies of Portugal (which pay Selvage and Lee), was to publish a pamphlet *On the Morning of March 15*. The cover was blotched with blood-like crimson spots over a black background. Inside were pictures of dead bodies and such lines as: "Over 200 Europeans and 300 innocent Africans and mulattos lost their lives on that day. They were tortured, butchered and mutilated with a degree of bestiality that is not condonable on any terms." The pamphlet concluded: "Are they [the natives in revolt] fit to merit the support of the United Nations, or any Christian, civilized society? Are they fit to enlist the support of the United States?"

Murder and sadism are reprehensible. But no mention was made of the millions of slaves taken by the Portuguese from Angola and shipped to the New World, many dying before their arrival. No mention was made of the napalm bombings and spraying of natives with flaming oil Portugal used to beat down the revolt. No mention was made of the 50,000 Africans killed since the rebellion broke out or the 200,000 who have fled to the Congo in order to escape the savage race warfare.

The Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs then proceeded to smear the friends of Angola. In November, 1961, a broadside, signed by Martin T. Camacho, Chairman, was sent to prominent Washingtonians. Its aim was to label the American Committee on Africa, forthright in its sympathy for the revolt in Angola, as Communist-infiltrated. Various individuals were attacked for positions they assumed in the 1930's and 1940's. A minister was flayed for signing a petition to save the Rosenbergs from the electric chair. Another person was accused of being hostile to the Un-American Activities Committee. A third was berated for a trip to Russia in 1932 to make a motion picture. After concluding that the American Committee on Africa was being used by "sinister forces which seek the downfall of this country," Martin T. Camacho exclaimed: "Let me emphasize that the primary concern of the Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs in this matter of Angola is the security of the United States itself."

Now each of us has his own interpretation of what enhances "the security of the United States." But Dr. Camacho failed to note that a Statement on Angola calling for self-government, and circulated by the American Committee on Africa in the same month of November, 1961, was endorsed by such spokesmen for "sinister forces" as Van Wyck Brooks, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Hans Kohn, Karl A. Menninger, Reinhold Niebuhr, Michael J. Quill, A. Philip Randolph, Victor G. Reuther, Pitirim A. Sorokin and Harold Taylor, among many others. The objectivity of the indictment also becomes somewhat dubious when we learn that Dr. Camacho himself receives a weekly retainer from Selvage and Lee and that the offices of the Portuguese-American Committee are maintained by S & L.

Part of the campaign to stain Red the Angolan revolt has centered around a "White Paper" that NBC eventually produced, to its credit, in the latter part of 1961. This program was based on a trip made into northern Angola during the height of the revolt by Robert Young of NBC.

Rumors reached Selvage and Lee that the program, though committed to a balanced presentation, would show atrocities carried out by the Portuguese against the natives. Mr. Young had been quoted in earlier press releases, coming from Leopoldville, as sympathetic to the rebellion. Thus alerted, James P. Selvage sent a letter and a Memorandum to the Executive Producer of NBC, copies of which were forwarded to several other persons.

The Last Man To Seek Censorship

Mr. Selvage explained to NBC his connection with "a group of some 40 industrial corporations and banks doing business in the overseas provinces of Portugal." He disclaimed any thought of pressure on the network: "I would be one of the last persons in the world to seek any form of censorship of the news or views." He wished only to point out that "the Angola invasion is a plainly earmarked Communist activity led as the 'attorney of record' by one Holden Roberto, who is under Moscow tutelage as he boasts in an attached letter." Mr. Selvage ended: "Selvage and Lee would under no circumstances take an account of this nature if it did not believe in the principle involved and that in helping a friendly NATO nation we are helping our own country."

The Memorandum enclosed was dated the same day and appears to have been drawn up for the specific purpose. It consisted of eight pages, fourteen points,

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and three suggestions. The first suggestion, though Mr. Selvage was against all censorship, was that "a provocative White Paper at this time . . . could only help recreate a new trouble spot for the United States Government while the Kremlin rejoices – and benefits." Best not to have the program. The second suggestion was that, if the program had to go on, Portuguese reforms should be a significant part of it. Writing of these reforms, Mr. Selvage stated: "The most recent and most important of these will be announced early next week," a peculiar statement for a man who, following his own claims, merely represented private Portuguese companies and who therefore could not be sure what the government of Portugal would announce a week hence. The third and last suggestion was to read George S. Schuyler's article in *The Pittsburgh Courier*.

Much of the Memorandum was of little import, dredging up the same old charges. The revolt was not a revolt, but an invasion of "foreign" detribalized Angolans and Congolese. Weapons were discovered with Czechoslovak markings. The invaders were Red-inspired followers of Lumumba, Sekou Toure and Nkrumah. They used "the well-known Communist terrorist tactics of torture, mutilation and murder." Robert Young, the NBC reporter, was "utterly prejudiced." Sympathizers of the revolt had "a long list of smelly associations on record with the un-American Activities Committee of the House."

A Mere Matter of Forgery

Of all the charges in the Memorandum sent to NBC, only one needs careful study. In making the flat statement that Holden Roberto, the leader of the revolt, was "pro-Communist," Mr. Selvage referred to a circular letter sent out from the Union of Peoples of Angola headquarters in Leopoldville and signed by "Dr. Holden." I obtained a copy of the letter, which does indeed bear the UPA (Independence Party) stamp. Written in French, the significant paragraphs are as follows:

"Here is, in a few words, our plan for the future. SEKOU TOURE must rule in the northern part of Africa. Comrade NKRUMAH in the center and your servant HOLDEN ROBERTO in the south . . . Communism is not bad. During our stay at Moscow, we were able to see many magnificent things that the Westerners will never have.

"Courage, courage. Money, money and more money. First LUMUMBA and then us . . . LONG LIVE COMMUNISM. . . ."

The first time I saw the UPA letter I was baffled. I have known Holden Roberto for some time. Mr. Roberto in some ways is one of the least anti-Western leaders in Africa. The Union of Peoples of Angola is, in Mr. Khrushchev's terms, a bourgeois nationalist party. By origin of the Bakongo people (southwest Congo and northwest Angola), Mr. Roberto has been emotionally tied to the Abako, the tribal party of the Bakongo that controls Leopoldville, the most "anti-Communist" of all Congo parties outside Katanga and the group most violent in its opposition to the late Patrice Lumumba. Of course, Roberto might reluctantly accept Communist aid, as George Washington took aid from the despotic France of Louis XVI or countries like Ethiopia, India and Tunisia accept aid from the Soviet Union today. But to accept diplomatic and economic Communist support in a life-and-death struggle for independence is no proof of Communist affiliation – else we would have to consider the larger part of the world Communist today. Mr. Roberto has never been to Moscow; his only excursion into a "socialist" country was last fall, when he went to the Belgrade Conference. The only military aid he is now getting is from the Tunisians and Algerians. In fact, the UPA letter is a forgery.

I showed Mr. Roberto the letter and signature when he returned recently to New York. He said that the stationery and stamp were stolen from the UPA office in Leopoldville by agents of the Portuguese. He confirmed that the letter had been forged, being neither his thought nor even mode of expression. The false signature is not even a good imitation of the way he writes.

The work of Selvage and Lee continues. The original draw of $150,000 received last May was soon exhausted and requisitions of an additional $47,000 in July and October, 1961, were honored by cash. Apparently *The Pittsburgh Courier* and the Holden Roberto forgery are standard items in the S & L kit of propaganda for the Salazar regime. In the November, 1961, issue of *The Reader's Digest*, Brig. Gen. Frank L. Howley (Ret.) and Max Yergan, a Negro who has made his livelihood for almost 20 years by journalism of the hack anti-Communist type, reported on Angola. General Howley learned, after a short visit to the African colony under the auspices of the Portuguese Government, that "the head of the UPA is Holden Roberto, who supported the Congo's pro-Communist Lumumba and himself follows the Communist line." And Max Yergan added that the only doubt existing on this question "is whether the leaders are themselves Communists or merely accepting Communist help." Thereupon a small printed letter was sent out with reprints of *The Reader's Digest* article to thousands of newspapers throughout the United States, starting: "Dear Friend: Why do you Americans, our longtime friends, vote with the Russians in the UN and thus incite this awful terror?" and signed "Overseas Companies of Portugal," address 500 Fifth Avenue, New York City – the address of Selvage and Lee, Inc.

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Is War Obsolete?

The Inhibiting Effect of Absolute Weapons

by Louis J. Halle

When, on an August day in 1945, the headlines announced that the atom had been split and its power extracted, the news was received everywhere as the announcement of a revolution that would permanently transform human society. The general view was that the date of the achievement would go down in history as the great turning-point in man's fortunes, dividing a primitive past from what would be an altogether new era. The availability of practically unlimited power, whether for war or peace, was bound, for one thing, to destroy the old foundations of international relations.

The fact of a revolutionary transformation, however, was easier to predict than its nature. Widespread speculation, mostly alarmist, tended to concentrate on the military uses of atomic energy, which were most immediate at the time and have remained so. Seventeen years later, the impact of the new development on warfare has been decisive, while its peaceful uses have not yet been conspicuously realized. It is in the expanded military possibilities, with all their implications for international politics, that the revolution has taken place.

The speculation which the splitting of the atom provoked 17 years ago was necessarily without any basis in actual experience of the consequences. Much of that speculation, plausible at the time, is forgotten today because the trend of events has not borne it out. Thus we no longer worry, as we did at first, about the danger that nuclear weapons will be smuggled into our country in suitcases to blow up our cities by surprise (an atomic time-bomb in the baggage-room of Grand Central Station), although the physical possibility exists today as it did not exist then.

In 1962 we still can only speculate about what our mastery of the atom is doing to our old world, but we have more to go on. The idea that the achievement had a quality of absoluteness, which we associated with the original atomic bomb, calling it "the absolute weapon," has tended to be confirmed by what has since been produced: multi-megaton explosives, thousands of times more powerful than the original bomb, and inter-continental missiles to deliver them. Associated with this absoluteness is the experience that over the past 17 years the world has escaped major warfare while enduring international tensions such as would, in an earlier time, have provoked it before now. This gives us something to go on, however slight, in speculating about the direction that our revolutionized world is taking.

Although the atom may at any time destroy civilization and, with it, the hopes of mankind, we ought to recognize as a cold fact that for the past 17 years, at least, it has contributed to the maintenance of an essential order in international affairs. It has deterred the resort to major warfare by any power in a position to start such warfare; it has inhibited the expansion of limited wars; and it has imposed a degree of sobriety and moderation on the international policies of the great powers. What we have seen at work here is a general principle: *while all-out conflict may be consonant with limited weapons, absolute weapons require that conflict be limited.*

This is not a principle that I have invented for the occasion or drawn from nothing better than our 17 years' experience out of more than 5,000 since history began. It is a law of nature, or at least a strong tendency in nature, with general applicability in the animal kingdom. I cite for my authority an article in last December's issue of *Scientific American* entitled "The Fighting Behavior of Animals," by an animal-behaviorist, Dr. Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt of the Max Planck Institute in Germany. Dr. Eibl-Eibesfeldt begins by pointing out that, while fighting between members of the same species is almost universal among vertebrates, such fighting almost never ends in death and rarely results in serious injury to either combatant. "If this were not the case – if the loser were killed or seriously injured – fighting would have grave disadvantages for the species" (mankind included, one supposes).

The avoidance of death or serious injury in combat is

LOUIS J. HALLE *was in the State Department for 13 years, first as Policy Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and later as a member of the Policy Planning Staff. He is now a professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs in Geneva, Switzerland.*

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understandable among animals that lack deadly weapons. A pigeon, for example, with its soft bill and weak claws, hardly has the means to do much damage in combat with another pigeon. But how about those animals that do have deadly weapons – rattlesnakes, for instance? Rattlesnakes can kill each other with a single bite. "When male rattlesnakes fight, however," Dr. Eibl-Eibesfeldt tells us, "they never bite."

How, then, do they fight?

"The two snakes glide along, side by side, each with the forward third of its length raised in the air. In this posture they push head against head, each trying to force the other sideways and to the ground. . . . The successful snake pins the loser for a moment with the weight of his body and then lets the loser escape." Presumably the verdict is accepted by the loser and the dominance of the winner established.

Animals with limited means of inflicting injury may fight all-out, but those with "absolute weapons" engage in only limited fighting. In fact, most contests of strength among vertebrates are largely ritualistic, and ritualistically limited, like those of turkey-cocks putting on competitive displays of size and power, swelling themselves up and struggling before each other, until one acknowledges himself the loser by retreating, perhaps without any blow having been struck at all.

This kind of thing has always been common in the behavior of nations. It was to deter Japan from being too aggressive toward the Philippines that President Theodore Roosevelt, in 1908, sent the United States Navy on a ceremonial tour of the world, during which it stopped for a courtesy visit in Tokyo harbor, where it displayed the size of its guns and the weight of its armor-plate before the Japanese. A similar purpose no doubt moved our government to invite foreign observers (including Russians) to witness the first explosion of a hydrogen device at Eniwetok in 1952, and moved the Soviet Government to send a missile to the moon on the eve of Prime Minister Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959. Again, in 1961, at the height of the Berlin crisis, Moscow engaged in demonstrative explosions of multi-megaton bombs. This is like the action of turkey-cocks: it is the display of strength for the intimidation of one's rivals.

These ritualistic displays among nations, as among non-human vertebrates, often involve the exchange of blows. When Great Britain, Germany and Italy had a quarrel with the Venezuelan Government in 1902 they sent their fleets to parade off the Venezuelan coast. In the course of this parade the fleets sank three Venezuelan gunboats and fired some shells into two forts at Puerto Cabello.

In 1938, the Russians and Japanese engaged like turkey-cocks in mutual displays of strength and determination along the Amur River dividing Siberia from Manchuria, displays that in this case involved heavy exchanges of artillery fire and resulted in casualty lists. Having demonstrated before each other for several weeks, the two nations then reached an accommodation on the basis of what had been demonstrated. Again, in 1958 Peking gave a display of strength and determination in the Formosa Straits that involved heavy shelling of the Nationalist-held island of Quemoy. The Nationalists, however, backed by the United States, held on and answered back. Consequently, Peking found it prudent to discontinue its display and, in effect, to retire – the more so as it evidently could not count on Moscow's backing.

Such mutual demonstrations between nations have undoubtedly been far commoner, from the beginning, than all-out fighting – even, one supposes, in the days when rocks and clubs were the deadliest weapons. Combative and willful as our species may be, all-out fighting among its own members has been rather the exception than the rule. Like the pigeons, however, the nations of mankind have been able to afford it because their weapons were less than absolute. Now, however, they have at last moved out of the pigeon class and joined the rattlesnakes, which can kill each other with one bite. Today the United States and the Soviet Union, in their great contest, could kill each other with one bite. Like the rattlesnakes, however, they now show an instinctive inhibition against biting, an inhibition distinctly greater than ever before.

What is the behavior we observe in Berlin today? Is it not that of the two snakes who push against each other, head to head, but never bite? Both sides use tear-gas bombs freely, but never the nuclear bombs that each also has.

Limited Wars

Our experience of having absolute weapons, of being in the position of rattlesnakes, is too short to draw confident conclusions for our future. The habit of never biting has had no time to become established among us, and for the present we depend on a large measure of conscious reason (presumably lacking among the snakes) to support it. But there is surely a basis for some hope here, however moderate. Among the fearful prospects of our time is one, at least, that is not altogether fearful. In our speculations we are not obliged to leave it out of account or unexamined.

The inhibition against all-out warfare, for which we have nuclear weapons to thank, has inevitably tended to spread to limited forms of war, simply because of the danger that they would not remain limited. The Western powers and the Soviet Union are notably reluctant to fire even conventional artillery-shells in the Berlin contest, knowing how likely even such

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limited fighting would be to go over into all-out fighting with the absolute weapons. The effect of absolute weapons, therefore, has been to inhibit the resort to war in any form at all.

This inhibition applies directly, however, only when nuclear weapons are in the arsenals of both sides in a conflict. The rattlesnake analogy applies to conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, but not to conflict between the United States and Cuba; for, while the United States could kill Cuba with one bite, Cuba could not inflict any major injury on the United States. Yet it is evident that in this case, as in like cases all around the world (witness Great Britain *vs* Iceland, France *vs* Tunisia), a powerful inhibition on the resort to war has also existed since at least 1945. What is the source of this particular inhibition?

Nuclear weapons in the distant background may be a factor in some cases. It is always possible, for example, that if France undertook the military conquest and subjugation of Tunisia other countries would be drawn in, the fighting would grow in extent and intensity, and at last the greatest powers with their nuclear weapons and long-range missiles would become involved.

But this, clearly, is not the primary inhibition in our time on the use of force by a great power against a weak state. It does not explain why the United States does not subdue Cuba by force; and if it did explain this it would not explain why the United States and Great Britain were effectively inhibited from using force against Mexico in 1938, when the Mexican Government seized the properties of the American and British oil companies. For the inhibition on the use of force by a great power against a weak state, be it noted, had already manifested itself clearly before nuclear weapons came upon the scene.

The root cause of this inhibition, I think, is in the secular development of active participation by whole populations in the conduct of national and international politics. In the 18th Century, if we go back that far, wars were between individual dynastic sovereigns, and the populations under their rule paid little attention. Thus it was possible for Laurence Sterne to embark from England on his "Sentimental Journey" to France in 1765 without recalling, until he was in mid-Channel, that his country was at war with France; and it was then possible for him to go on and travel through France without being regarded as an enemy alien. He did not identify himself, and he was not identified, with the military enterprises of his king.

The political detachment of the people, before the French Revolution meant that the military conquest of territory was not followed by a problem of pacification. The populations affected tended – at least where religion was not the issue – to accept the new ruler as the old and to go on about their business.

The French Revolution and the growth of nationalism changed all that in Europe. Now when Germany overcame France, as it did in 1871, it found that the French people would not accept the verdict, that they would not be pacified. In 1713 it had been possible to make a real peace with Louis XIV, even though it involved his surrender of territory. But the French people, a century and a half later, would not accept the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. The statues representing them in the Place de la Concorde were draped in black for almost half a century, and the unpacified French counted the days till they should avenge themselves.

Force of Public Opinion

This kind of popular involvement, with its consequences, did not begin to manifest itself in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America until the present century. Throughout the last century, the European powers could conquer and rule Chinese territory in the assurance that the Chinese people would obey their new masters as they had the old. After 1931, however, the Japanese found that, while they could march their armies freely over the body of China, the new generation of Chinese in the conquered territory refused to be pacified. They refused to submit, but continued their resistance behind the lines by all the means at hand; and this made it impossible for the Japanese to consolidate their victories, to bring the struggle to an end.

Eighty years ago, having conquered Egypt, Britain could rule it. Today Britain still has the military means to conquer Egypt, but having done so would find the task of holding down the rebellious Egyptian population, in perpetuity, intolerable. This, alone, would inhibit her from undertaking the conquest.

The difficulty of pacification is not, however, the only or the greatest inhibiting factor that popular participation in international politics has put upon the resort by a great power to the use of force against a weak state. Even more important is the reaction to be expected of popular opinion all over the world, including that within the great power itself. Popular opinion inside Britain contributed, along with overwhelming American and Commonwealth opinion, to forcing the British Government, in 1956, to abandon its military adventure against Egypt.

Today the United States has the military means to conquer Cuba. Having done so, however, it would face the ugly and endless task of pacifying the Cuban people. With sufficient ruthlessness, we may suppose, it could achieve the task – if only by exterminating the population. What would be decisive against such an undertaking, however, even if public morality and the difficulty of pacification were not, would be the politi-

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cal cost elsewhere. For, all over the world, popular opinion would turn against us. We should find that we had gained Cuba at the price of losing the rest of Latin America, together with most of what good will we had in other continents. We could conquer Cuba only at the price of isolating ourselves in a hostile world.

What we have seen develop in our time, then, is a complex of well-nigh decisive inhibitions against the use of force by a great power, whether against another great power or against a weak state. The complex applies to the Communist powers as well as to those that take their stand on freedom, although it is, for a variety of reasons, somewhat less powerful in restraining them from military action against weak states.

Weak Against the Weak

But how about the use of force by one weak state against another weak state – the only remaining category of overt international war to be examined? (We may assume the continuance of the obvious inhibition that has always restrained the weak from attacking the strong.)

The record shows that here, too, an inhibition against going to war has arisen in our time. Until the 1930's, for example, there was almost always an open and declared war going on among the Latin American states. Since then there has been not one.

The explanation, I think, is that in our shrinking world such wars can no longer be isolated. The international organizations and the great powers get drawn into them. When that happens, the state that has started such a war is bound to find that it has lost control of it, and it is likely to find itself subjected to irresistible intervention from without. This prospect alone is enough to make the resort to war unattractive to it.

A major development of our times, then, is the radical obsolescence of open, declared, international war; the radical obsolescence of war as an accepted means of conducting international relations. It is a simple fact of observation that such fighting as has occurred in the world since 1945 has all been in situations of civil conflict, even where those situations have been no more than a disguise for international conflict. The only exception to this, the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel in 1956 (disguised by the two great powers as a police-action), proved the rule by its failure.

If, in our time, and after so many millenia of history, the open resort to war is genuinely becoming obsolete, then an immense question is posed for us. How will adjustments in international relations, made necessary by the secular evolution of nations, be brought about hereafter? How will contests and disputes that could not be resolved, up to now, except by the traditional procedures of warfare, be resolved without them?

We have seen, in the past 17 years, that the inhibition on the resort to war has tended to freeze the international *status quo*. No more spectacular example exists than that of the division of Germany and the utterly anomalous status of Berlin. We may suppose that, in any previous age, this situation would have been resolved long ago by what used to be called the arbitrement of arms. The Russians would have taken West Berlin by force; or the West Germans would have marched to the rescue of the East Germans. But what happens today?

The question arises whether the *status quo* can remain frozen forever?

I suggest that, if the inhibition on war prevails, we have in our time seen an end to abrupt changes in the *status quo* except under extraordinary circumstances involving crisis and the agreement of the powers involved. This does not mean, however, that it will not change gradually, as the landscape changes by erosion. We all recognize the erosion of the Western position in Berlin that is taking place today. In Laos we are trying to cope with a similar process of erosion. On the other hand, Moscow's position in Albania has already eroded away, and its position in East Germany is jeopardized by erosion. (What is the Berlin wall except a retaining wall against the erosion of East Germany?)

"Erosion" is a metaphoric term here, and we ought to go behind it to say explicitly what we mean. What we mean, I think, is that the *status quo* will be altered eventually by changes in the relevant popular opinion. If popular opinion among the Laotians comes increasingly to support the Communists – whether because it is attracted or because it is intimidated – then Laos will eventually move into the Communist camp. If popular opinion in India becomes increasingly hostile to the Communist powers, India will tend to move into closer relations with the West. And so it will go.

This is not a simple picture, if only because the term "popular opinion," in this context, means "the opinion that counts," and this varies widely from one country to another. Nevertheless, it is to evolution in the allegiance of the human mind that we must look for the evolution of the *status quo*, if the uses of force have at last been as drastically reduced as I believe they have.

This confronts us, at last, with the one use of force that represents an exception (and that only a partial one) to the general inhibition against the resort to war – the use of force in crypto-warfare or in guerrilla warfare. Such warfare, however, is so closely associated with the movements of popular opinion as to become almost a function of them. It is axiomatic that guerrilla

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forces succeed only where they have the support of the local population. A victory in guerrilla warfare, therefore, is essentially the expression of a victory in the contest for men's allegiance.

Ultimately, no party to the great international contests of the new era in which we now live will be able to hold a position except on the basis of local allegiance – "allegiance" being broadly interpreted. If the population of West Berlin loses confidence in the West's ability to defend it, it will melt away, and what remains of it will at last come to terms with the Communists. If Moscow finds it impossible to win the allegiance of the East Germans, whom it now holds by force, it will be constantly tempted to reduce the burden and the risk of so holding them by entering into arrangements that might give them first a status similar to that of Poland and then a status like that of Finland, until in the slowly shifting configurations of the international scene everything is changed.

For we must not expect that the present alignments of the Cold War will last forever, or that they will be concluded by victory for one side or the other. The two great alliance-systems will break up some day, however gradually, and there will be new combinations that we cannot now predict, perhaps involving a general abandonment of the system of sovereign nation-states as we have known it in recent history.

All this depends, however, on the avoidance of a major war that would leave behind it only the ruins of our civilization and a wrecked remnant of mankind. We must therefore be alert, on both sides in the Cold War, to cultivate as an increasingly established habit obedience to that natural law by which rattlesnakes, in their mutual combats, never bite.

The Censorship Bugaboo

Radio-TV Programming and the FCC

by Michael A. Taylor

Since early last May when FCC Chairman Newton Minow's speech before the National Association of Broadcasters nailed T. S. Eliot's "wasteland" to the antennae of the TV industry, the specter of increased government control over programs has hovered over Madison Avenue. After nearly seven months of official silence, Robert Sarnoff of NBC and Dr. Frank Stanton of CBS fired simultaneous salvoes in early December at any public officials presuming to decide when television is good and when it is bad. Chairman Minow replied in San Francisco on December 22: "The broadcasters will no more censor the FCC than the FCC will censor broadcasting . . . those of us at the FCC have a right to freedom of expression too."

The justification for federal intrusion stems from the physical characteristics of the broadcast medium itself. The radio spectrum is a band of limited width, extending from 540 to 1600 kilocycles. Since 10 kilocycles are needed to put out an intelligible signal in the AM medium, there can never be more than 105 channels. The situation in television is comparable. Six megacycles is the required width of the television broadcast signal, limiting the possibilities to 12 channels in the Very High Frequency (VHF) band. Without some sort of central authority to determine who shall broadcast where, at what frequencies, and with how much power, the competition for broadcast facilities is likely to result in overcrowding. This was what happened in the 1920's, and it led to the Radio Act of 1927, which sought to bring order out of chaos. Seven years later, the Radio Act was replaced by the Communications Act of 1934, establishing the Federal Communications Commission and prescribing the conditions for government control of broadcasting.

The Communications Act, Section 307(a), states that the Commission shall grant to any applicant a station license, ". . . if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby." Subsection (d) states that these broadcast licenses shall not extend for a term of longer than three years and that the licensee must apply for renewal of the license at the end of the prescribed period. Over the years, the FCC has developed numer-

Michael Taylor *has been employed by the National Broadcasting Company and is a law student at Columbia University.*

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ous criteria by which it seeks to implement its "public interest" mandate. These criteria include:

1. Local ownership of the prospective licensee
2. Participation of owners in civic activities
3. Integration of ownership and management
4. Diversification of background
5. Broadcasting experience of applicants
6. Proposed program policies
7. Operating plans
8. Diversification of ownership of mass media.

Any one of these criteria may be understood as an attempt to arrive at a tentative conclusion regarding the type of program service that the applicant will ultimately provide, since the end product of broadcasting is the program itself. What is broadcast is the only possible measure, outside of purely technical matters, of the ultimate service or disservice to the public.

This is a major point. Far from being a peripheral criterion not properly within the scope of the Commission's consideration, as some witnesses at the recent FCC hearings contended, program content is the *only* criterion, again eliminating purely technical matters, that indicates the extent to which the public interest will be served by the revocation or renewal of a broadcast license. This fact has been unnecessarily obfuscated by the FCC itself, which tends to submerge its license renewal decisions in the language of local ownership, broadcasting experience, or financial capabilities, seldom stating specifically the precise extent to which any one of these criteria has been controlling; and seldom stating specifically the reason why, for instance, local ownership is important in the first place – as a possible indication that the applicant has the community's interest in mind and that therefore his *programs* are likely to be in the public interest.

Program Content and Licensing

The power of the FCC to consider, directly or indirectly, the matter of program content in passing on applications for broadcast licenses has been further de-emphasized by the historical reluctance of the Commission to deny applications for license renewals. In the 34 years since the Federal Radio Act, only three license renewal applications have been denied.

The best-known of these cases is *KFKB v FRC*, decided by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1931. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's refusal to renew the license of station KFKB, owned and operated by a latter-day medicine man named Dr. Brinkley who conducted three one-half hour programs daily in which he answered letters of ailing listeners by prescribing, in most cases, medical formulae prepared and dispensed by Dr. Brinkley himself and identified only by number. The Commission, in denying the application, held that this practice was inimical to public health and safety and thus not in the public interest. Affirming the Commission's decision, the Court of Appeals said that the power of the Commission, as exercised here, was not censorship.

In another such case, *Trinity Methodist Church, South v FRC*, decided in 1932, the Commission had refused to renew the license of station KGEF in Los Angeles. KGEF broadcast 23 one-half hours each week and was dominated by the Reverend Doctor Shuler who used it for intemperate attacks on the Roman Catholic religion, Judaism and the local courts and bar association. The Reverend Doctor Shuler had twice been convicted of attempts to obstruct by radio the orderly administration of justice. In a sweeping opinion upholding the Commission's determination, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that the action was "not a denial of the freedom of speech, but merely the application of the regulatory powers of Congress in a field within the scope of its legislative power." The Court again stated that the public interest standard requires the Commission to consider the past conduct of the licensee and that such consideration does not amount to censorship or a previous restraint upon speech.

Section 326 of the Communications Act states that "Nothing in this Chapter shall be . . . construed to give the Commission the power of censorship . . . and no regulation shall be . . . fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." This is the provision frequently cited to support the view that the FCC is powerless to consider program content under the "public convenience, interest or necessity" standard.

Censorship, however, as that word is commonly defined, includes an element that is absent when the FCC denies renewal applications on the basis of program content – the element of prior restraint exercised upon specific words, phrases or sections of a proposed publication. The FCC acts *after* the offending publication and its action is not specific but general, in the sense of being directed at a continued course of conduct over a period of time. The absurdity of using this provision as justification for a blanket denial to the Commission of all consideration of program content is patent. First, it would mean ignoring or declaring improper many of the Commission's license decisions of the past 34 years. Second, it would require the abandonment, not solely of the criteria of program content, but also of those other criteria (local ownership, operating plans, diversification of ownership of mass media, etc.) which are meaningful only insofar as they illuminate the question of the probable nature of prospective

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program service. The Commission would thus be required to base its license decisions on technical matters alone and it would be deprived of any rational basis for deciding between mutually exclusive applicants for the same or similar broadcast facilities.

Licensing and the Constitution

What of the argument that refusal to renew a licensee's station permit on the basis of program content is a deprivation of property proscribed by the Fifth Amendment? That claim is effectively disposed of by Section 301 of the Communications Act itself which says that "no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license." "Ownership" of the airwaves rests in the public domain and there is no taking of property when the FCC revokes a station permit. The contention that such a denial was a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment was considered and rejected by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in *The Trinity Case*.

It is further contended by some in the broadcasting industry that the "public interest" standard is so vague as to render the FCC's licensing power unconstitutional. Conceding that a degree of specificity is a necessary element of due process, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, considered and rejected this argument in the *NBC Case*, decided in 1943.

But the most persistent constitutional objections to the FCC's power to refuse license renewal on the basis of program content arise under the freedom of speech guarantees. The broadcasters' position on this point, in its most extreme form, runs as follows: If the Commission refuses to renew a station license solely because past programs presented by that station do not meet with its approval, the Commission is in effect abridging freedom of speech since it is well established that radio broadcasting is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.

Few broadcasters argue that the right of free speech is an unqualified right. However, they differ with the Commission over the exact extent to which that right may be abridged, contending that any such abridgment must at least stop short of program content that is merely mediocre or excessively violent. If there is a reasonable limit to the exercise of the right of freedom of speech, there is certainly a limit upon the extent to which the right may be abridged. The problem is to achieve a verbal formulation of the dividing line between protected speech and speech outside of the First Amendment. The FCC has several points in its favor.

As we noted earlier, the physical limitations of the broadcast medium necessitate some licensing power to allocate frequencies between competing applicants. Whether the licensing power is to be limited to purely technical considerations or whether it is to include such matters as program content is a problem to be settled by Congress in view of the necessity of some rational basis for differentiation between competing applicants in the common situation where technical considerations are substantially equal. It can be persuasively argued that Congress, in passing the Communications Act of 1934 and renewing the public interest standard, was aware of the interpretation that had been placed on that phrase by the Commission and the courts under the Radio Act and that therefore Congress gave its tacit approval to such an interpretation by leaving the standard unchanged.

The courts have conclusively declined to limit the Commission's considerations to technical matters alone. The exact extent to which the Commission may exceed purely technical considerations, however, has not been precisely determined. The only case on the subject that has reached the Supreme Court, the *NBC Case*, was decided in favor of the Commission. However, that case involved a limitation on network affiliation practices as they affected program content, and not upon program content itself.

Moreover, in refusing an application for license renewal, the FCC is not acting as a censor or imposing a previous restraint upon speech. The applicant is per-

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fectly free to go on saying whatever he wishes to say without interference. He is merely deprived of the use of an instrument of commerce to help him in saying these things, and the Communications Act is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to impose reasonable restraints on interstate commerce.

Until such time as the Commission actually does deny a licensee's request for renewal on the basis of mediocre or excessively violent programming and its determination is carried into the courts, it is impossible to know the outcome of the First Amendment argument in such a situation. We can say, however, that the most important limitations on the FCC's licensing power are practical rather than legal. The strain imposed upon the Commissioners' time by renewal applications alone (1,500 a year, or about six per working day) is tremendous and these are apart from other regular business such as applications for construction permits for new stations, applications for the transfer of existing station licenses, and the conduct of the other FCC divisions outside of the broadcast bureau. Without a basic revision in the organization of the Commission, this situation will not be significantly changed. But when such a revision was proposed last year, it was defeated 323-77, in the House.

Of at least equal importance as a brake on the Commission is the extraordinary power of the broadcast lobby. A former chairman of the Commission, James Fly, has said, ". . . we ought to recognize that what we are dealing with here has the greatest political force of anything in the country. . . . As a result, the political forces are well nigh intolerable when you are sitting in the middle of the thing and trying to do a job for the public."

Indirect Pressures

Still, beyond the powers sanctioned by the Communications Act, there are a wide range of less formal devices by which the FCC can exert pressure on the broadcasters. A familiar example is the chain broadcasting regulations, issued by the Commission in 1941. The interesting thing about these regulations is that, although the most direct way to eliminate prohibited practises would have been to penalize or enjoin the networks that engaged in them, the Commission was forced, due to the limitation on its power set by the Communications Act, to act not against the networks but against individual stations as their licenses came up for renewal. But the result, once the validity of the regulations was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the *NBC Case*, was undoubtedly as conclusive as if the Commission had proceeded directly against the networks themselves.

Then, there is suasion. By simply announcing its displeasure with certain types of programs or by recommending the establishment of new types of program service, the Commission can sometimes hold the industry within at least minimally-acceptable patterns of conduct. This is, in effect, what happened when the FCC issued its "Blue Book" in 1946. The "Blue Book" recommended certain standards in the matters of sustaining programs, local live programs, programs devoted to the discussion of public issues, and advertising excesses. The Commission exhorted the industry to assist it by engaging in self-regulation and promised to give particular attention to these factors in future license renewal cases. Since that time the "Blue Book" has been required reading for broadcasting executives.

Finally, the Commission has affected programming by some behind-the-scenes maneuvering. This is what happened in the recent sale of WNTA, Channel 13 in Newark. When the station was placed on the auction block, several commercial bids were received substantially exceeding the bid made by an educational group. Mr. Minow let it be known that he gave his "moral support" to the educational proposal, however, in view of the fact that the New York market, the largest in the country, has never had an educational station. The station was subsequently sold to the educational group and when the deal threatened to fall through due to the opposition of New Jersey's Governor Meyner to relinquishing his state's only television facility, Mr. Minow's administrative assistant took an active part in effecting a compromise which was suitable to all parties. The Commission's part in the matter was wholly informal but nonetheless effective.

Mr. Minow's latest suggestion, advanced in a speech before the National Press Club in Washington on January 11, is that Congress require manufacturers to make television sets capable of receiving UHF channels as well as the standard VHF bands, thus increasing available facilities. At present, television viewers are reluctant to incur the additional cost necessary to equip their sets with UHF when there are so few areas where UHF broadcasting is a reality. Television broadcasters, on the other hand, are equally reluctant to expend large sums on UHF transmitting facilities when there are so few viewers. There is some question, however, as to whether a Congressional mandate requiring manufacturers to build sets capable of receiving UHF signals would contravene the "no deprivation of property without due process of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the bill is not expected to pass in this session.

On the same day that the all-channel receiver proposal was made public, another suggestion for reform came from the Educational Media Study Panel under the Commissioner of the Office of Education. It issued a report calling for a national effort in the develop

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ment of educational television facilities and recommended that the federal government provide financial assistance for educational TV.

And at about the same time Sen. Thomas J. Dodd's subcommittee investigating juvenile delinquency, announced that it would hold hearings on sex and violence on TV. The subcommittee is reported to be interested primarily in a number of programs presented by ABC, among them *Bus Stop*, *77 Sunset Strip*, *The Roaring 20's* and *Surfside 6*.

The FCC and the Networks

Any realistic appraisal of the "wasteland" leads us back to network practices, not the practices of the individual stations that are network affiliates and which within certain limits, rely upon and are very much at the mercy of the parent network. When, in 1927, Congress sought to impose a standard of public responsibility upon broadcasters by passing the Radio Act, the only meaningful unit upon which to impose this responsibility was the individual station. NBC was formed in the year of the Act's passage, and CBS a year later. In 1941 the FCC issued its chain broadcasting regulations prohibiting exclusive affiliation and territorial exclusivity arrangements, regulating option time and the duration of network affiliation agreements, and limiting network control of individual station rates and dual network operation by a single person. But these regulations could still be applied only against individual radio stations, not against the networks themselves.

As a matter of administrative convenience the FCC in May of 1960 submitted to the House Commerce Committee a proposed amendment to the Communications Act which would empower the FCC, as "the public interest, convenience or necessity may require," to issue rules and regulations with respect to the networks similar to those which now govern individual stations. The same amendment was submitted to Senator Pastore's Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee on August 1, 1961, and were introduced by Senator Pastore as Senate Bill 2400 on August 10, 1961.

Predictably perhaps, this bill has already been roundly condemned by the networks and their representatives. Yet the source of their apparent dismay is difficult to discern. The rules and regulations which the Commission would be empowered to issue are only for the purpose of assuring "that the policies . . . of such networks shall not adversely affect the ability of broadcast licensees to operate their stations in the public interest." This would seem little more than reasonable in view of the Commission's express finding, that "the station licensee has little part in the creation, production, selection and control of network program offerings. Licensees place 'practical reliance' on networks for the selection and supervision of network programs which, of course, are the principal broadcast fare of the vast majority of TV stations throughout the country."

What, then, are the networks whining about? Part of the answer is that it is simply "good form" for the networks to oppose FCC proposals, no matter what they may be. The networks have attempted for some time to sell themselves to the public as bastions of free enterprise engaged in a life-or-death struggle with a power-hungry federal bureaucracy. Their efforts along these lines have been marked with significant success, especially in the Congress where they have a ready-made audience of legislators who themselves have financial interests of varying sizes in the broadcasting industry. During the 10-year period from 1940 to 1950 hardly a year went by without a clarion call from some Representative or Senator for an investigation into the machinations of the FCC.

The networks may have another thought in mind, however – the possibility that the Commission will submit additional recommendations for legislation before the Pastore bill is actually taken under serious consideration. It is difficult to imagine what these recommendations might be in view of the Commission's consistent rejection of network licensing provisions and in view of the fact that six of the seven Commissioners, Mr. Minow excepted, are holdovers from the Eisenhower Administration. It is difficult to believe that the Commission has turned up any new incriminating information about the industry as a result of the most recent hearings. As one observer has remarked, there was a "love feast" between the Commission and the networks, and not, as widely predicted a showdown between Sheriff Minow and the "bad guys." High noon came and not a shot was heard. At one point Chairman Minow observed, "We're after the same objectives. How you get there is the question." That is certainly *a* question if not *the* question, and it is unfortunate that the participants never got around to discussing it.

The TV industry has been under extensive government scrutiny for some time, but has exhibited a remarkable instinct for survival. The Department of Justice has long contemplated antitrust action against the three networks. The Federal Trade Commission has held hearings on the subject of misrepresentations in TV advertising. The payola and quiz show scandals ruffled the illusions of millions of listeners and viewers and the Dodd subcommittee is now probing the relationship between TV and teenage delinquency. Finally, of course, the FCC has recently displayed signs of a renewed vigor. But whether we get better and more varied TV programs out of all this remains to be seen.

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Who Needs Educating?

The agitation in the Pentagon because so many reservists have proved recalcitrant is understandable but perhaps is irremediable. It suggests a pressing need for indoctrination of the armed forces; but there is a question of whom to indoctrinate – the troops, or the high command? Until this question is answered decisively, it seems probable that the agitation will continue.

Such determined enthusiasts as ex-General Walker are immutably convinced that the urgent need is to tell the men what we are fighting for. But the discontent of the reservists is evidence that there is a fairly widespread opinion that there is greater need to tell the generals what we are not fighting for.

We are not fighting for Batista. We are not fighting for the oil interests and the sugar interests with property in Cuba. We are not fighting for the United Fruit Company, or for the Aluminum Company of America. We are not fighting for the Belgian copper trust. First of all, we are not fighting for the privilege of serving in the armed forces.

A segment – perhaps not large, but highly vocal – of the brass seems to harbor the delusion that every civilian should consider military service a privilege. One suspects that this same segment harbors also the delusion that there can be no real fight unless it is a grudge fight. Yet the bloodiest and most furious war in which the United States was ever engaged was marked by constant fraternization between Federal and Confederate troops; and in both World Wars armies of American conscripts managed to come out on top.

The argument most often advanced in support of indoctrination of the troops is the allegation that our men failed dismally in Korea. It is true that at the Yalu River we suffered the most smashing defeat inflicted on any United States Army since Bull Run; but that defeat was precipitated, not by mutiny in the ranks, but by the folly of a commander who never did understand clearly what we were fighting for.

A more effective argument could be made if it were agreed that indoctrination will start at the Pentagon, where every officer from the rank of major up will be subjected to lectures explaining that the Americans are not a militaristic people. They perceive that fighting is occasionally necessary, but they perceive it with regret and they fight with regret – well enough, thus far, to win, but not well enough to become enthralled with the joy of combat. Commanders who understand this will shape their policies accordingly.

The complaining reservists, for example, having done their regular tour of duty in the armed forces, were dragged away from their homes and jobs again and were understandably resentful. The fact that a few were so foolishly resentful that they went to the edge of mutiny and had to be slapped down doesn't change the fact that the resentment was natural.

Yet when they asked what they were supposed to be fighting for, the only available answer was, because trouble threatened in Berlin. That was not a sufficient answer, but it was the only one the generals could give because it is the only one they know. Ask a general, "Why is there trouble in Berlin?" and the only answer both succinct and intelligible is, "Because it is a point of friction between us and the Russians." Ask him "Why do we maintain this point of friction?" and he can only say that this is a political question not within the purview of military men.

Yet that is exactly what the reservists want to know. Perturbed General Decker has explained that in a very real sense we are at war with the Russians. But what about? What are we fighting for? We are right back to the original question, and someone must tell the Pentagon before the Pentagon can tell the men.

The accepted formula is that we are at war, which up to this point is only a cold war, to maintain the ideal of political liberty. But will that formula survive the test of application to a specific situation? If we should make war on the Cubans, for instance, because they want Castro and we don't want him, wherein should we be better than the Russians who used tanks and machine-guns to compel the Hungarians to accept a man acceptable to the Russians? And if this is maintaining political liberty, have the words any meaning?

The one gleam of hope in this situation is the fact that the President, thus far, has been making persistent efforts to clear up this obscurity. To date, his achievements have been largely negative. He has eliminated, one by one, certain minor issues – things that we are *not* fighting for. When he refused to knock down that wall, for example, he made it clear that we are not fighting for East Berlin. In the end, he may get down to the real issues; and if and when he does General Decker will have no more trouble with reservists.

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Katherine Anne Porter's Crowning Work

by Stanley Kauffmann

Katherine Anne Porter has published her first novel at the age of 72, and since she spent 20 years on it, we must assume it will be her only novel. She forecast the book in 1940 in the preface to the Modern Library edition of *Flowering Judas:*

> "[These stories] are fragments of a much larger plan I am still engaged in carrying out. . . . All the conscious and recollected years of my life have been lived to this day under the heavy threat of world catastrophe, and most of the energies of my mind and spirit have been spent in the effort to grasp the meaning of those threats, to trace them to their sources and to understand the logic of this majestic and terrible failure of the life of man in the Western world."

Here at last is the fruit of the effort. *Ship of Fools,* whose title is taken from a 15th-Century German allegory is so complex that it must be described briefly. It narrates the voyage of a German passenger ship from Vera Cruz, first to Havana, then to some European ports, and finally to Bremerhaven in August, 1931. The large cast

Ship of Fools
by Katherine Anne Porter
(Atlantic-Little, Brown; $6.50)

of characters includes several German couples and individuals; a Swiss family; several Mexicans; two young American artist-lovers, an American divorcée, an American engineer; a troupe of Spanish dancers; a group of Cuban medical students; the captain and the ship's doctor; a Swede; and a Spanish countess deported from Cuba. In steerage there is a mass-character: 876 Spanish workers being returned from Cuba – men and women – who sicken, fight, murder, and give birth below decks during the crossing. About 30 of the first-class passengers are principals in the story.

The formal symbolism is so patent and so "very old" (as Miss Porter says in her foreword) that it is a quickly assumed bond between her and us. Her use of "this simple almost universal image of the ship of the world on its vogaye to eternity" tells us that she is too concerned with large issues to devise small novelties. Its familiarity helps to place her work in a historical continuum and helps the reader to focus on content rather than form.

The first point basic to an understanding of this novel is the significance of its date: August, 1931. The United States was writhing in the Depression. Latin America was erupting through a 400-year-old crust of Castilian cruelty. To name the two European countries relevant to this book, in Germany the Nazi Party had leaped from 800 thousands votes (1928) to 6.4 million votes (1930); in Spain the Bourbons had been deposed, and the country had been made an arena for fratricidal left factions whose quarrels eventually invited the Falange. In short, Western man was beginning to run the fever that resulted in the collapse of a society founded on Judaeo-Christian ideals. Five thousand years of ethical monotheism, two thousand years of compassionate saviorism had produced a 20th Century that began with a world war and Fascism; now it was hastening towards Nazism and a vaster war. The seal was soon to be set on the fact that this particular spiritual and moral effort of the human race had not succeeded; that the relics of outward forms and *nostalgie de dieu* were no proof otherwise; and that another way must be found. Midsummer 1931 is a good place to mark the start of the last great landslide; what was always latent begins here to be visible.

The second basic point is a truth often obscured by Miss Porter's reputation as a writer concerned with sensibility and subtlety. She is a social-political artist as well. *Flowering Judas* and *Hacienda* are examples of this, as is the novella that is the clearest antecedent of the present book: *The Leaning Tower,* which deals with a young American painter in Berlin in 1931. In life as well as art Miss Porter has not been immured in ivory. Apropos of Jenny, this novel's young American painter ("She had picketed dozens of times . . . and had been in jail several times"), it can be noted that Miss Porter was arrested as a Sacco-Vanzetti picket in Boston in 1926. Throughout her life the spheres represented by the novels of Virginia Woolf and of Malraux have concerned her simultaneously.

It would be easy and superfluous to ticket each of this novel's characters. The doctor, duel-scarred and Catholic, represents what is traditional, proud, reticent in Germany; the young American pair represent the license for neurosis inherent in the New World's liberalism. And so on. As for the principal events: the grotesque flirtation between Herr Rieber and Lizzi Spoeckenkieker represents the sexually and socially frustrated elements that surged to support Nazism; the carnival masks are the truth about the maskers; the births in steerage en route symbolize the persistence and growth of the vindictive proletariat. All this, like her use of the ship image, is patent. Miss Porter has set no puzzles to be solved; the microcosmic symbols in her novel are crystalline.

It is more pertinent to discuss the book's achievements with those symbols. In substantial part this, unfortunately, means discussing its shortcomings, for, to me, the book is a

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disappointment. This was inevitable, of course. No book by any mere human being could be awaited as long and as fervently as Miss Porter's novel and then fulfill all expectations. But it is more of a disappointment than allowance for mortality explains.

To begin where any novel first meets us, before themes or characters are manifest: its style. Recently I re-read all four of Miss Porter's collections, and I understand Edmund Wilson's bafflement about commenting on their style: "a surface so smooth that the critic has little opportunity to point out peculiarities of color or weave." The style is neither stunning nor in itself poignant; it is inconspicuous at the same time that it serves the highest demands. It can rarely be quoted for itself, yet is rarely banal.

But in the novel there is a small yet radical change of texture, more of an enameled richness with paradoxical lapses which, like cracks in a table, reveal the veneer; and (to shift metaphors) for all the faintly plummy diet, there is a certain lack of sustenance. Its general feeling as against her past work, is one of somewhat more labor and slightly less certainty. No excerpts can adequately convey the effect of Miss Porter's prose, but these passages from the description of La Condesa may be some indication of what I mean. "She was slender except for a lazy little belly, and her clothes were very expensive-looking." The first half is masterly, the second is commonplace and involuted. Why not "looked expensive?" It is at least simpler. "On her right [hand] she wore what appeared to be a light-colored much-flawed emerald." The implication of "what appeared to be" is misleading; in the event the sentence would be both cleaner and more accurate with the phrase deleted. "These hands, very narrow, fine, heavily veined and old-looking, were in constant movement." Besides the excess of "very" and "looking" in one paragraph, why not "moved constantly"?

This is not to apply the marking-methods of a composition class to a distinguished writer. Only because she has been so exceptional a stylist does the prose of the present book seem less pure – moderately ornate with the attendant penalties of ornament. If previously there were few quotable master strokes, there were also few heavinesses.

There is no central character. Because Jenny, the American painter, seems in some measure autobiographical, we suspect at the beginning that she is the pivot of the book, but this does not turn out to be so. The book's view is impartial, divine. The tapestry structure that Miss Porter has chosen – the frequent interweaving of numerous character and narrative strands – is a difficult one to handle at such length. As far as transitions are concerned, Miss Porter manages it well – which is to say that, in a sense, she ignores the problem. She lets her interest in the next character she approaches take the reader with her. Only when she uses vaguely cinematic methods (we are "inside" A and walk past B; we then go "inside" B and watch A walk past), when she is worried about a transition and draws our attention to it by using a device, only then is there a slight jar. Otherwise this rigorous structural juggling is well executed.

The snare of this method, which Miss Porter by no means escapes, is compulsive rotation. After A and B have been absent for a while, Miss Porter returns to them, subjectively, whether or not she has anything to add to their portraits or has new action in which to involve them. She gives them further scenes merely to keep them alive for the reader, which leads to considerable repetition and duplication.

This duplication undersores a kinetic lack in the book. The characters are well perceived and described, but we know all that Miss Porter has to say about most of them after the third or fourth of their episodes. We know that Jenny and David are going to quarrel, although they would like to love each other: that Denny, the engineer, is going to be stupidly vulgar; that Frau Rittersdorf is going to write stuffily in her journal; that Professor and Frau Hutten are going to behave like George Grosz characters. Once they are established, there is little development of them in depth and only for a few of them has Miss Porter devised modest narrative. At the end the doctor knows more about himself as a result of his encounter with La Condesa; Freytag, the German with the Jewish wife, sees his position more clearly; perhaps the American couple are a little wiser about each other. As for the others, barring a few mild adventures for some, they are pretty much where they were in the first half of the novel. Although we have recognized them all very early as valid human beings, we are not much illuminated past what we initially recognize. The book is a portrait gallery, not the morality play or allegory it promises to be.

This fact – that we are given a cross-section of European and American characters and characteristics rather than a progressively meaningful drama – takes us to the largest criticism that must be made of the work.

The sign of a masterpiece (and surely Miss Porter's novel must be judged as masterpiece or no) is the creation of extra life; under such analyzable matters as style, structure, character there is a deep oceanic swell. It is a supra-real effect, the bright intangible circle made by the spinning tangible wheel. That effect is not made here; always we see only the hub, spokes, rim. We can see how (generally) well made the novel is and well written, how well observed in terms of surface and immediately sub-surface elements; but the most we ever get from it is magnified recognition, never extension or exaltation. Partially this may be because Miss Porter, unlike Tolstoy, Stendhal, Malraux, sees no further into the heart of the several intrinsic mysteries than we do, thus can only set down more superbly than we could what is more or less common knowledge. There are other reasons, too.

One does not quite presume to tell Miss Porter how she could have achieved profundity, but it is possible to point out a few ways in which she cut herself off from it. First: two-thirds of her principal characters are German, and with the exception of the doctor – who, doomed by heart trouble, is an enforced philosopher – they are uniformly repulsive. Sometimes this repulsiveness is imposed with blackboard-and-pointer observations: "The Captain, from his eminence of perfectly symmetrical morality, a man who steered by chart and compass,

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secure in his rank in an ascending order of superiors so endless the highest was unknown, invisible to him, took deep pleasure in his apocalyptic vision of the total anarchic uproar of the United States, a place he had never seen. . . ." Mostly it is evoked with conventional accurate touches: creases of fat on the back of the neck, smug *gemuetlichkeit*, sentimentality about animals. ("'Go away, get out,' commanded Herr Rieber . . . but because Bébé wore a hairy hide and was on all fours he was therefore sacred, there was no question of using sterner measures.") All through the book run prognoses of Nazi action: Nuremberg laws, gas chambers, euthanasia, world conquest. Although all of it is true enough, it is hardly completely representative of Carl von Ossietzky's country; and it turns the book into something of a thirty-year-old anti-German tract.

Second, a similar point, the only Jew in the book is Herr Loewenthal, who is a believable character: whining, aggressive, fearful, the product of the centuries' ghettos. (The scene in which Freytag is forced to sit at table with him for the first time is a small gem of misadventure.) Miss Porter, I think, wanted to use Loewenthal's cringing behavior with his cabin-mate and others as a foretaste of the fact that still staggers young Israelis: that German Jews rarely resisted their oppressors. But as her group of Germans is too unrelievedly dark, so her single Jew gives too mean and sullen a picture. (Freytag's wife is described otherwise, but she is not present as a force in the book.)

These two criticisms merge in a greater issue. Miss Porter is writing of the "majestic and terrible failure" of Western man, but all one can feel on finishing this book is that if this *is* Western man, it is high time that he failed and there is little majesty or terror in it. As with the Germans and Jews, on a larger scale her portrait is incomplete if she meant Western man, entire, to be her protagonist. There is scant hint in it of what makes his failure worth regret, scant trace of lost possibilities of grandeur. The book is thus less tragic than satiric; but satire about a huge complex of civilizations ceases to be satire and becomes misanthropy.

One does not urge a more sanguine view on Miss Porter; this in only to note some of the elements that keep us from the edge of the abyss she presumably wanted to show us. In his monograph on her four previous books, Harry John Mooney, Jr. writes of her autobiographical character, Miranda, and of Upton, the hero of *The Leaning Tower:* "Both Miranda's tragedy and Charles Upton's horror spring from contemporary history; they are the result of those hostile elements, only dimly perceived in the order of the world, which spell death for the individual plan for happiness." There is little of this tragedy or horror for any of the characters in this novel. Either they are satisfied with the world or (like the dancers) contemptous of it or (like Jenny) flirtatious with its responsibilities. The title of the book becomes more literal than figurative, and the whole effect is smaller than we anticipated from Miss Porter's crowning work.

Prosperity in Western Europe

by Paul Mattick

This companion volume to the previously published *America's Needs and Resources* embraces the eighteen West European countries which are still "responsive to the free play of market forces rather than government fiat." Dealing with the region as well as with individual countries, the book contains such an enormous mass of data as to defy all attempts at summarization. Instead, then, of trying to recapitulate the findings of a long list of topics, such as recovery, population, manpower, output, expenditures, consumption, housing, transport, education, security, government, investment, trade, etc. I shall examine the survey's "philosophy" as represented by its various American and European authors.

Europe's Needs and Resources:
Trends and Prospects in 18 Countries
by J. F. Dewhurst, John O. Coppock, P. Lamartine Yates and associates
(Twentieth Century Fund; $12)

Like its American predecessor, this volume measures and analyzes Europe's needs and resources in their strictly economic connotations, *i.e.*, consumers' needs are defined in terms of market choices and spending patterns at various income levels, incorporating government expenditures and investments whether public or private. Resources are, of course, the real physical, natural and human productive resources. The survey focuses on measurements of past trends and interprets them with regard to future expectations. 1955 serves as the base year from which changes in population, employment, working hours, productivity, gross national product, and so forth, are projected in the year 1970. The authors are aware of the fallibility of all such extensions, but adhere to the optimistic hypothesis that things will continue to be what they have been since about 1950. Thus 1970 is envisioned as a year of high-level activity and the intervening period, though not free of the cold war, is expected to be free of real war as well as from depressions and violent inflation.

Aided by the Marshall Plan, Western Europe achieved its recovery by 1950. From then on and down to 1959 its combined gross national product increased by 46 percent, or 4.3 percent annually. If this rate is maintained, output will be doubled in about seventeen years, or by 1967. The reason for the upswing was sustained expansion of fixed capital investment and industrial output. New machinery and equipment constituted an unusually large part of total capital formation, but the resulting general prosperity brought with it a vast demand for consumers' durable goods. Contrary to prevailing legends, however, governments, not the free market forces, were directly responsible for initiating and, to some extent, sustaining the high level of investments. Extensive war damages and nationalization of industries "put the investment problem well beyond the

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powers and duties of private capital."

Despite the years of prosperity, however, Western Europe's "per capita income and labor productivity are still less than half what they are in America." Even so, and on the assumption that capital formation fosters economic democracy, it is said that "what was formerly a class society characterized by wide differences in income and manner of living has become a much more democratic community with a much narrower range of spendable income." In brief, Europe is becoming more like America and her manufacturers are responding to this trend by developing mass production of standardized articles. But it is also noted that most of the nations of Western Europe are more "socialist" today than they were before World War II. There prevails not only a general egalitarian trend but also the narrowing of wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor together with all the other aspects of the "welfare state," such as rent and price controls, old-age, health, and unemployment insurance, subsidized housing and agriculture, family allowances financed in varying degrees by general taxation and special taxes collected from employers and workers.

These welfare measures are not, it is said, designed to create a more productive economy but to distribute more "equitably," or at least more evenly, the current output of the economy. According to Professor Dewhurst, their purpose can best be expressed as "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." It is a strange anomaly, Dewhurst writes, "that the nations of the West, who preach and practice private capitalism, have come closer to the socialistic goal of economic quality than the 'socialist democracies,' who, while paying lip service to this distant Communist Utopia, employ rewards and punishments and create inequalities found only in the early and rugged forms of capitalism." This is so, of course, because in economic terms they do represent an early and rugged form of capitalism even if the state has taken on the functions of private capital.

It would be a "strange anomaly" indeed if Western capitalism was in the process of "socializing" itself – if only in terms of income distribution. But this survey contains no data to substantiate the "anomaly," unless the quoted fact that "wages have risen more extensively than the cost of living since World War II" is taken for such proof. Yet all that the respective data shows is that under conditions of full employment and a high rate of capital formation – which implies increasing productivity – living standards are bound to improve (as they always have under similar conditions.) But it will come as a great surprise to both the many new millionaires and the somewhat more affluent workers of Western Europe that the recent economic changes have led to "the elimination of the 'idle rich' at the top of the income pyramid and to the 'oppressed proletariat' at the bottom."

To be sure, such exaggerations are at once modified because of the European division into advanced and retarded nations and of a similar regional division in particular countries. Even for the progressive nations "substantial income differences" are still admitted; yet, consumers at virtually all income levels, Dewhurst writes, "are beginning to acquire 'middle class attitudes' about the goods and services they demand and the kind of lives they want to live." As they have in America, producers in Europe now demonstrate "the logic of mass production – the principle that the more goods you produce, the less it costs to produce them, and that the more people are well off, the more they can buy – and that therefore no one can make money by lowering class barriers. This is Marxism confounded – not by slogan, but by the logic of industrialism itself."

Unfortunately, the making of money by the lowering of class barriers through the cheapening of production has not yet penetrated the workers' minds. "Partly because of the persistence of craft traditions," Dewhurst says, "and partly because of class consciousness, union resistance to technological change and worker mobility is far more common and restrictive practices more widespread than in America." Also the difference "in the tempo of work appears to reflect deep-rooted differences in the realm of ideas and attitudes." Despite all the progress made, "European workers do not appear to have the same confidence in capitalism" as have American workers. Of course, with a per capita income only half that of the US, their confidence in the "dynamics of mass production" is bound to be smaller.

When it comes to special surveys which concern themselves with consumption, housing, education, and health, the "welfare state" appears no longer as an expression of a growing economic affluence but rather as an unavoidable means of maintaining social stability. "According to one view," writes Heinz Um ath, "housing represents a fundamental human requirement the denial of which may have grave social consequences." And according to another view – no, from any point of view – the conditions of modern industrial society require a definite minimum of social welfare which must be secured by the state when the free market economy fails to do so. These welfare measures remain quite inadequate in comparison with the actually-existing social needs, which are something other than they appear in their "strictly economic connotations."

The precondition of all social welfare is more production, for, according to Dewhurst, only the accumulation of capital will lead to a "socially conscious free market economy." While Ritchie Calder, writing on technology, bases his hopes in this respect on increasing automation leading to increased employment – because up to now automation had had this effect where it has been introduced in Europe – Dewhurst suggests a more efficient use of machinery *à la* Groucho Marx (*cf. Duck Soup*) by "shortening and staggering lunch periods." Of more immediate importance than a fuller use of existing machinery and the introduction of automation, and as precondition for its successful large-scale application, is the current European integration movement, which, according to L. L. Sermon, implies "greater concentration of ownership and control, which in turn allows Europe to form larger production units with consequent economies in investment." All this means "rationalization and modernization by the reduction in the number of workers in relation to the vol-

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JULES FEIFFER

DON'T GET ME WRONG - I THINK IT'S **WONDERFUL** THAT YOU KIDS ARE PROTESTING AGAIN. BUT WHY DON'T YOU PICKET THE **RUSSIANS**?



WE **ARE** PICKETING THE RUSSIANS.

DON'T GET ME WRONG - I **DEPLORE** THE APATHY THAT ONCE SWALLOWED OUR YOUTH, BUT AREN'T PICKET SIGNS THE CRUDEST FORM OF PUBLIC DEBATE?



WE'RE WILLING TO TALK.

DON'T GET ME WRONG - I **FAVOR** FULL DEBATE OF OUR GLOBAL POLICIES, BUT WON'T WE **HARM** OURSELVES BY SEEMING DIVIDED IN THE EYES OF THE REST OF THE WORLD?

THEN YOU'RE **AGAINST** PROTEST?

DON'T GET ME WRONG - I THINK IT'S **WONDERFUL** THAT YOU KIDS ARE PROTESTING AGAIN. BUT COULDN'T YOU FIND YOURSELVES **ANOTHER** FIELD?



WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE IN MIND?

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

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DON'T GET ME WRONG -

NO SIR.

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ume or value of production." It is for this reason that "many American enterprises are setting up factories in these countries in order to produce inside its custom barriers the goods they want to sell within the European Community."

What does the actual and the hoped-for increase of production and productivity in Europe imply within the frame of a welfare and full employment program? It will, no doubt, bring with it a better competitive position *vis-à-vis* America and the recapturing of markets previously lost to the United States. It will not open the European markets to outside competition because exports are Europe's prime necessity. With regard to essential industrial raw materials, Europe, a have-not region, in order to function as a "workshop" of the world, must import raw materials in always larger measure and compete with always greater fervor on the capital goods markets. Economic frictions with both the advanced and the retarded nations are bound to increase with the resumption of Europe's competitive drive. Her future is determined not by her own economic and organizational measures but by the future of world economy as a whole. Seen from this angle, the optimism displayed in *Europe's Needs and Resources* appears more like protracted whistling ing the dark.

ARCHITECTURE

Monumental Decision

In its final report, expected in the next few weeks, Francis Biddle's Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Commission will recommend the controversial design of eight soaring tablets to Congress as a fitting monument to FDR in the nation's capital. Biddle's bi-partisan group is disappointed but undaunted by the fact that the National Fine Arts Commission, on February 22, rejected the design as inappropriate company for the Washington Monument and the Jefferson and Lincoln Memorials. Since the Art Commission's function is merely to advise, Biddle feels it is now up to Congress to decide the fate of the memorial the legislators proposed almost seven years ago.

Last fall the same Fine Arts Commission approved with gusto the design for a Theodore Roosevelt Memorial. After less than two years since Congress resolved to build him a monument, TR seems all but set. Construction awaits only the new appropriation for the National Park Service, which has included the necessary $1.4 million in its budget. The FDR Memorial will cost nearly $5 million, but the problem is not yet money; it is design. The two concepts – that of TR and FDR – and the manner of obtaining them are in significant contrast.

As has been the case with most of the nearly hundred statues, monuments and memorials that grace Washington's public park land to the point where it threatens to resemble a boneyard, the designers of the TR Memorial were simply appointed by the powers-that-be with generous assistance of the reactionary National Sculpture Society. As a result, Teddy Roosevelt will be memorialized by a seventeen-foot-high bronze statue by Paul Manship which shows him in rhetorical pose, bullying the public across Eric Gugler's oval plaza amidst stiffly formal gardens. The design should please the "but-I-know-what-I-don't-like" critics who bombarded the daringly modern FDR Memorial with epithets. The Manship-Gugler creation will remind them neither of Stonehenge nor of "book ends out of a deep freeze." Indeed, it will recall countless heroically realistic Lenin statues and Mussolini parks across the seas. It will be located on Roosevelt Island beneath that new highway bridge across the Potomac, which Virginia commuters vainly hope will relieve their rush hour traffic.

Thanks to Francis Biddle, the proposed monument to FDR is the result of a national competition which tapped the creative resources of the entire nation. It was conducted under strict rules of the American Institute of Architects with the professional assistance of the brilliant young architect-planner Edmund N. Bacon, the director of the Philadelphia Planning Commission. The site was carefully chosen by a committee of experts which included Lewis Mumford and, like the competition, was also approved by Congress. It is the landstrip between the Tidal Basin and the Potomac, called West Potomac Park. The FDR Jury, headed by the dean of MIT's architecture school, Pietro Belluschi, was among the most distinguished assembled in our day. There were 574 entries from architects, sculptors, landscape architects and others associated with architects. All of them were serious attempts, some of them by prominent artists.

The final winner was a team of unknowns – three young Harvard archi-

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tecture students, Norman Hoberman, David Beer and Joseph Wasserman, then working in the New York architectural office of Pederson & Tilney under the supervision of William F. Pederson. The form of their sculpture – a cluster of eight upright tablets of varying sizes and shapes – carrying quotations of FDR's most famous words – is the work of Norman Hoberman, the sculptor member of the team.

Photographs tend to make the composition look somewhat dead and contrived. The models show it well placed in a new, attractively landscaped 66 acre park, amidst clumps of trees and meadows. The parking space is conveniently close, yet out of the way. The monument itself is approached by ambling footpaths which also connect it with the other monuments on the Mall. The steles are so placed that they will reflect both in the Tidal Basin and the Potomac. Rising from a terrazzo platform of different levels and a variety of spaces, they are visible from afar, yet obstruct nothing. The whole composition is powerful and imposing, yet light and transparent.

"This thing is not sculpture. It is abstract," declared Paul Jennewein, the president of the National Sculpture Society. "It is the epitome of mid-century art . . . that needs no excuse or defense of any kind," replied architect Philip Johnson, who is emerging as the most dynamic of America's second generation moderns. An imposing array of his colleagues have been equally enthusiastic.

The competition rules required that the design harmonize with three other great monuments in the vicinity – Washington, Lincoln and Jefferson. The Jury found it did. The Fine Arts Commission said it violated this "law." How does one harmonize a space age creation with an oversized obelisk, a pseudo-Roman pavilion and a neo-classic temple? How does our government advance public art and domestic and foreign respect for it, if its Fine Arts advisors continue to cling to remembrances of neo-classicism? As guardian of classic Washington which it largely helped to create, the National Fine Arts Commission has done nobly in bygone days. It was often difficult, as can be imagined when one recalls that there was a railway station on the Mall when the Commission was first appointed 60 years ago. But even then concrete was used, which the Commission ruled not durable enough for the tablets of the FDR Memorial design. In fact, the Romans invented the material which is now reinforced with steel. Had the Romans also inspired the design, the Commission would probably not have raised the question.

Some, of course, hold with Walt Whitman, who remarked, more than a century ago, that "the day for conventional monuments, statues, memorials, etc. has pass'd away . . . they are superfluous and vulgar." But are they? Many of us admire Philip Johnson's stirring Roofless Church, sheltering the Lipchitz sculpture, in Harmony, Indiana, or Reginald C. Knight's memorial to Enrico Fermi in Chicago, or the the late Eero Saarinen's daring steel arch for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial now going up in St. Louis. There are a good many other new monuments here and abroad which seem to prove that the art of our time is able to inspire. Chances are that the FDR Memorial design, too, will appear greater and more inspiring in the future than it does to our present uncertain tastes.

The easy way out is to name a bicycle race track, a school for foreign service officers, or a cultural center after FDR. But Congress wanted a monument. We could wait for a more courageous generation fifty, sixty, a hundred years hence. But William N. Dunn, a labor representative, spoke for many when he said it was we who prospered through FDR's greatness. It is this generation which wishes to recall him to our children.

To reject or shelve the winning design would sadly discourage public competitions and a fresh, creative approach to public architecture. It would encourage only the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial kind of mediocrity. And mediocrity, Jacob Burckhardt has said, is the truly diabolical force in the world.

Wolf Von Eckardt

Notes on Contributors

Paul Mattick *has written extensively on world economics.* Wolf Von Eckardt *is the author of a book about the work of the architect Eric Mendelsohn.*

For the Hidden Facts and Sharp Criticism of

Kennedy's Test Resumption

You will want to read the March 12 and March 19 issues of **I. F. Stone's Weekly.** The first demonstrates that the decision to resume testing was based on "gamesmanship" not sober analysis of military or technological need; and reveals some startling facts about our military posture. The second shows how public opinion continues to be misled about test detection. Here are facts you won't find elsewhere on Britain's success in monitoring our new underground series and how Project Gnome showed Edward Teller was wrong in his "big hole" salt cavern calculations. You can get these two issues free if you use the blank below to subscribe now to Washington's unique 4-page newsletter, now in its 10th year, the least expensive and most independent of its kind. **Only $5 a year.** Free yearly index sent to subscribers on request.

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Correspondence

Trouble in Brazil

Sirs:

Louis Wiznitzer (*NR*, March 19) asserts that time has run out for Brazil. Revolution cannot be averted, a revolution which will propel Brazil toward "either a second India (democratic socialism plus neutralism), or a second China (Communism plus anti-Americanism)." His premises for this conclusion are two: rampant corruption and a teetering economy. Let's consider these individually.

The question is not whether corruption exists, but its proportion compared to the accomplishments of the economy. If Kubitschek did, as Wiznitzer intimates, purchase worthless land in the interior, located a new capital there, and then sell the worthless land at inflated prices to foreigners, it may not be strictly ethical but it is, if true, one way of attracting foreign capital. Moreover, Brasilia wasn't Kubitschek's only accomplishment. In 1955, before he became president, Brazil manufactured no automobiles, had few good roads, manufactured few electrical appliances or machinery, lacked enough electricity to support existing industries, imported all crude and 70 percent of her refined oil. Today Brazil is developing electric power in the Sao Francisco River in a project that rivals the TVA in scope and imagination; she is self-sufficient in refined oil and produces half of her crude requirements; she is building roads that span the country, manufacturing over 150,000 automobiles per year; she produces refrigerators, air conditioners, electric appliances, almost everything imaginable. These are accomplishments of Kubitschek's Administration and they are not to be discounted. In Europe we knew there were going to be Marshall Plan millionaires, but we had a job to do and we did it. I do not condone corruption, but we must be realistic in appraising its importance.

The second premise for Mr. Wiznitzer's inevitable revolution is a foundering economy. Unquestionably, inflation has become intolerable. But Wiznitzer's own figures belie his economic portrait. He discounts the rise in the GNP between 1947 and 1959 from 140.3 billion cruzeiros to 1.4 trillion because inflation depreciated the currency to 20 percent of its original value. Totalling these figures, however, you still have a 280 billion economy, which is double the 1947 figure. That outstrips the US for the similar period. In truth, the Brazilian economy, growing at a rate of almost six percent a year, is about the most vigorous in Latin America. It is an unstable economy, but not a dead economy. The problem today is a government unwilling or unable to cut its development plans to cope with that inflation; but this does not necessarily mean revolution.

Wiznitzer speaks vehemently of Brasilia as a symptom of the malady affecting Brazil. But Brasilia means something more than the lining of politicians' pockets. For example, Brazil's problem of agrarian reform differs from other Latin American countries where limited *productive* land must be divided and distributed to peasants. Brazil's vast unsettled land in the West presently has no attraction to any but pioneers (among other reasons because there is no natural river transportation leading out from the west to the populous, commercial east, and also there is no west coast, only impassable mountains). To induce the peasants to relocate could well signal a new life of hope for them, if the area is made economically viable. Brasilia could easily do that. Already sheltering 100,000 people, the city is growing apace. Eventually planned to accommodate a population of 500,000, these people will have to be clothed, fed, supplied with all sorts of necessities. In what can be characterized as a semi-voluntary *resettlement scheme*, Brazil is planting the biggest business in the world – government – in the middle of the western plateau.

Mr. Wiznitzer cites discontent among the peasants as a factor placing us in jeopardy of revolution. Peasants don't create modern revolutions. They didn't in Russia, or China, or Cuba. The peasants of Brazil, as in all Latin America, sit in the eye of the hurricane.

The true source of potential eruption, as Wiznitzer indicates, is the growing middle class. But, far from being wiped out, as he states, they are very much alike, and, despite their severe economic squeeze, the majority of them harbor a basic longing to maintain their

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institutions intact if at all possible.

Revolutions have to be led, and, as Wiznitzer suggests, the alternatives are the extremes, left or right, or some indefinable mixture involving Janio Quadros. Curiously, given these alternatives, he presages an end result of only a leftist neutralist or communist regime. The fact is that the extreme left in Brazil today does not have sufficient power to capture the government. Governor Brizzola in Rio Grande do Sul might attract headlines by taking over IT&T, a company which declared that it could not continue doing business in that state and for almost two years has been negotiating to alter their arrangement or get out. But no Brazilian of consequence has suggested expropriating a going concern that wants to remain in Brazil, nor has anyone suggested changing the constitutional provision which guarantees prior and full compensation, a provision with which Governor Brizzola will ultimately have to reckon.

A rightist coup will be a real threat only in extreme circumstances, as Wiznitzer himself indicates. Historically, the military in Brazil has never taken over and held power for the sake of power itself. While they conceivably might intervene if the Goulart government appears too far adrift, this would most likely culminate in elections for a new regime.

If the peasants, the left and the right aren't going to create this revolution, who is? Perhaps Quadros. But at this time Quadros seems to be relying on next October's congressional elections. Quadros' and perhaps Brazil's fate will be determined by those elections. If he wins a resounding triumph, there is also little doubt that he will radically overhaul Brazil's political and economic institutions. But, unpredictable as he is, Quadros' record and sympathies, as Wiznitzer indicated, are basically democratic.

Ronald Lloyd
Washington, D. C.

My attention has been called to an editorial note published in your March 12 issue under the title "Waiting for Quadros." I was shocked by the insinuations regarding me in the article in question, which I can only consider as irresponsible and libelous in text and tone. I want to make clear the following facts concerning the statements in question, in the order named:

1. No scandal has "rocked the country." There was a totally unsubstantiated accusation by a member of the House of Deputies, who has since been challenged to divest himself of Congressional immunity in order to appear in court as a defendant in libel charges.

2. I was called to Brazil merely and simply for consultation on the program for the forthcoming visit by President Goulart to the United States.

3. My only participation in the "Consultec" was as a technician and consultant, before taking office in Washington, no conflict of interest being involved. In fact (a) not a single project has ever been financed by the Development Bank under the conditions mentioned in the article; and (b) a standard clause in all services rendered was that they would be exclusively technical, with no direct contact with any governmental agency.

During the time I acted as consultant together with many eminent Brazilian technicians, I found that Consultec enjoyed a high technical reputation and that, in the unanimous judgment of the public and private enterprises that sought its services, its moral standards were unimpeachable.

May I note finally that no activities are more necessary in underdeveloped countries than those connected with careful economic planning and project analysis. I felt I was rendering a service to my country and it is with a deep sense of regret that I see a respectable publication like yours give shelter to slanderous comments on a constructive form of technical activity.

Roberto de Oliveira Campos
Ambassador of Brazil

Sino-Soviet Rift

Sirs:

There is now being displayed in this country a good deal of dialectical dexterity on the important and complicated question of how US policy does or should affect the Sino-Soviet dispute and what the policy implications of that dispute are. Not surprisingly, those who have always advocated a more "flexible" US line find that a militant US policy plays into the hands of the Chinese because it deprives the Russians of their "coexistence" argument. And, not very surprising either,

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those who have favored a tough US policy in the past argue precisely the opposite, namely that a "soft" policy also encourages Mao at the expense of Khrushchev, because it vindicates the Chinese line that the Bloc can pursue the offensive more vigorously with minimum risk.

The fact of the matter is that, in the short run, no matter what the US does in most given situations, the Russians and Chinese are likely to use that policy to justify their own preferred strategy. The present situation in South Vietnam is a good example. The Chinese argue that American behavior justifies their view that the US cannot be deterred from intervening in "liberation" wars and therefore that the Bloc must be prepared to fight and to win local wars with the United States. The Russians no doubt counter this by arguing that the US has so far been deterred from intervention in force and that South Vietnam can be won without taking large risks of local war with the United States. If we were to intervene in greater force, the Chinese would say they were vindicated and the Russians might well say that the Chinese and North Vietnamese pursued an adventurist line. Thus, in the short run, each side will use Western policy as a stick with which to beat the other. For there are no situations in which there is likely to be a clear-cut vindication either of the Russian or the Chinese line.

It, therefore, does not clarify matters very much to argue as *The New Republic* does on March 12 that in North Vietnam it is the militants, with their argument that "peaceful coexistence" runs counter to Asian Communist interests, who are vindicated when Marine reconnaissance missions appear on the central Vietnam highlands. One could just as easily argue that the militants are weakened by the appearance of the Marines because it demonstrates the fallacy of the Chinese view that liberation and local wars can be won without untoward risk. Moreover, the implicit assumption in this line of reasoning is that although the "militants" do not want "peaceful coexistence," the "moderates" do. What the "moderates" in fact want is the fruits of war without war.

There is, in short, no straight line from the Sino-Soviet dispute to US policy or vice versa. In the short run, Khrushchev and Mao can turn almost any US move into a point for their own side of the argument. In the long run, however, either the Russian or Chinese side of the argument is likely to be vindicated. That is, if Khrushchev's policy of making gains without local wars fails, the Chinese indictment of his strategy will have proven foresighted. Conversely, if Khrushchev's policy leads to a number of striking gains for the Communists, the Chinese will be defeated. And so will we.

In the middle and long run, then, it makes a great deal of difference what the US policy is. Weak US responses, particularly in those areas where it is the Communists who have taken the initiative, will certainly strengthen the Chinese view that the margin of risk can be raised. On the other hand, firm US responses in such situations will strengthen the Russian side of the argument that local wars are too dangerous because they will almost certainly escalate. In both our declaratory policy and our own posture, we should emphasize the dangers of escalation. At the same time, where the Communists have legitimate security interests, or where there are genuinely negotiable issues, or where there is a mutual interest in reducing the dangers of war, we should not be intransigent.

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